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INTRODUCTION

“The law of lawyers’ contracts is different,” Professor Joseph M. Perillo
tells us.1 This idea appears often in judicial opinions. Courts frequently observe
that “a fee agreement between lawyer and client is not an ordinary business
contract” given the legal profession’s “obligation of public service and duties to
clients which transcend ordinary business relationships.”2 As a result, courts
often state that they will scrutinize these agreements more closely than other
agreements.3 Lawyers must not only comply with generally applicable contract
rules, but they are also constrained by the special ethical rules governing
lawyers—rules that courts often apply as essentially substantive law in lawyers’
contract disputes—in their ability to make and enforce contracts.4 As a result,
contracts that would be inoffensive when nonlawyers are involved may become
objectionable in the eyes of a court when a lawyer is a party to the agreement.
Examples include contracts containing nonrefundable retainer provisions,5
referral provisions,6 and covenants not to compete.7
According to Perillo, courts engage in this more exacting scrutiny of
lawyers’ contracts for various reasons.8 They do so, in part, to deter unethical
behavior on the part of lawyers and to enforce the values of the legal profession.9
But courts are also concerned with how the general public views the legal
profession.10 According to Perillo, “courts have forged rules designed to create
respect for the legal profession and confidence in the system for the
administration of law.”11
Perillo is undoubtedly correct that, when it comes to making contracts and
attempting to have them enforced, lawyers are subject to more constraints than
nonlawyers. He is also unquestionably correct that various kinds of lawyers’
contracts can be unenforceable as a result of these constraints.12 However, when
one examines the decisional law involving one particular aspect of the business
and profession of the law, one sees a more complicated picture. When it comes

1. Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers’ Contracts Is Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
443, 443 (1998).
2. In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Ariz. 1984).
3. See, e.g., Marcus v. DuPerry, 611 A.2d 859, 861 (Conn. 1992) (noting that courts apply
close judicial scrutiny to contracts involving the attorney–client relationship).
4. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 445.
5. See id. at 451.
6. See id. at 461.
7. See id. at 479.
8. See id. at 444.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Professor Perillo does identify some instances in which courts have adopted contract
rules that seem to favor attorneys. See id. at 448 (noting some “pro-lawyer cases [that] differ from
the general law of contracts” by permitting a discharged attorney operating under a contingent fee
agreement to recover in quantum meruit).
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to fee agreements and the ability of a lawyer to recover compensation from a
client for services rendered, the law of lawyers’ contracts is indeed quite
different. And it is different in a manner more friendly to lawyers than traditional
contract law doctrine suggests should be the case.
There is a long history in the law of special protection for attorneys and their
fees.13 One example is the judicial creation and continued tolerance of an
attorney’s lien—a lien “‘not strictly like any other lien known to the law.’”14 An
attorney’s charging lien gives an attorney a security interest in a judgment in
favor of a client and works to ensure that the judgment cannot be paid to the
prejudice of the attorney’s claim to his or her fees.15 An attorney’s retaining lien
permits an attorney to withhold a client’s papers until the lawyer gets paid.16
According to one court, the attorney’s lien “‘was a device invented by the courts
for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of their clients, by disabling
clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for the valuable
services by which the recoveries were obtained.’”17 Notably, it is also a device
that is not available to members of other professions.18
As this Article attempts to demonstrate, in numerous instances in which
traditional contract doctrine would suggest that a contracting party should
receive no compensation for services provided to the other party, courts—to
varying degrees—nonetheless permit lawyers to recover from clients for the
lawyers’ professional services. There are some fairly extreme examples of this.19

13. For a discussion of some of the special prolawyer rules developed by courts in other
contexts, see Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453 (2008). See also Lester Brickman & Jonathan Klein, The Use of
Advance Fee Attorney Retainer Agreements in Bankruptcy: Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43
S.C. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1992) (stating that lawyers have been successful in “creat[ing] rules
exempting themselves from the reach of laws and doctrines that they, as lawyers, have been
instrumental in establishing or enacting to regulate the conduct of others”).
14. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir.
2000) (quoting RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 116, at 559 (2d ed.
1955)).
15. Id. (quoting BROWN, supra note 14, at 559); see also Perillo, supra note 1, at 469 (“The
charging lien is a security interest that the lawyer has in a judgment or settlement brought about by
the lawyer’s efforts.”).
16. Perillo, supra note 1, at 467.
17. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856 (quoting BROWN, supra note 14, at 559).
18. Perillo, supra note 1, at 470.
19. In Jackson v. Griffith, 421 So. 2d 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the attorney induced the
client to sign a fee agreement through coercion, duress, and undue influence. Id. at 677. Apparently,
this misconduct was not enough to convince the trial judge that the attorney should be denied any
recovery for the services provided. Id. Fortunately, the appellate court reversed. Id. In Gray v.
Atkins, 331 So. 2d 157 (La. Ct. App. 1976), an attorney obtained his client’s signature on a
document authorizing the attorney to retain the proceeds of a settlement by lying to the client about
the nature of the document. Id. at 162–63. Eventually, the client sued to recover the funds being
held by her lawyer. Id. at 159. On appeal, a Louisiana appellate court held that the “settlement”
agreement was void because it had been obtained through fraud and that the attorney was not
entitled to recover attorney’s fees for his services. Id. at 166. Despite the fraud, the trial court had
permitted the attorney to retain at least some portion of the settlement proceeds. Id. at 163. The
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Putting those cases aside as outliers, this Article focuses on one legal theory in
particular—the ability of public policy to render an otherwise valid contract
unenforceable.20
Under traditional contract law principles, a court may deem an agreement
unenforceable because it so clearly offends established public policy that
recovery under the contract is inappropriate.21 In such cases, there has
traditionally been a presumption against permitting the offending party to
recover, either under the contract or in quantum meruit.22 Yet, the legal
profession—through the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers23—
and the courts—through their decisions—have effectively reversed that
presumption and have created a general rule in favor of permitting lawyers to
recover fees, even when their fee agreements clearly offend well-established,
strong public policy.24 Moreover, although the majority of courts are likely to
hold that a fee agreement that fails to comply with an ethical rule is void as
against public policy, a significant minority of courts have demonstrated a
reluctance to do so in certain situations.25
Part II discusses the traditional contract rules pertaining to agreements that
allegedly offend public policy. Part III then compares those rules with the rules
on the same topic contained in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers. Part IV examines some common situations involving fee disputes
between lawyers and clients in which courts have found fee agreements to offend
public policy and how the courts have resolved lawyers’ claims for recovery,
either under the contract or in quantum meruit.26 Finally, Part V discusses some
possible explanations for the generally prolawyer approach of courts in these
cases and advocates for a return to the approach of general contract law that
would ordinarily deny recovery in quantum meruit where a fee agreement is
unenforceable on policy grounds.

appellate court raised a question as to whether the client might be entitled to a greater amount, but
because the client failed to answer the attorney’s appeal of the trial court’s decision, the appellate
court left the trial court’s award in place. Id. at 166.
20. See generally R.A. Horton, Annotation, Attorney’s Recovery in Quantum Meruit for
Legal Services Rendered Under a Contract Which Is Illegal or Void as Against Public Policy, 100
A.L.R.2d 1378 (1965) (collecting cases).
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
24. See infra Parts III, IV.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. As the Article focuses on fee disputes between lawyers and their clients, the discussion
generally excludes cases involving retainer agreements that might violate ethical rules having little
or nothing to do with fees, see, e.g., In re Lewis, 562 N.E.2d 198, 212 (Ill. 1990) (involving a “noaccounting clause” under which an attorney did not have to provide an accounting of expenses to
client), and fee disputes that are primarily between lawyers (as opposed to clients), see, e.g.,
Chambers v. Kay, 56 P.3d 645, 647–48 (Cal. 2002) (involving fee dispute between attorneys where
one attorney failed to comply with ethical rules regarding fee splitting).
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II. CONTRACTS THAT OFFEND PUBLIC POLICY
Courts have a number of legal doctrines at their disposal—
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, etc.—to police and void
objectionable contracts. However, when a court refuses to enforce a contract on
the grounds that the contract offends public policy, it is attacking a decidedly
different problem than it is in these other instances. The doctrines of
misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence serve to police the bargaining
process.27 In contrast, when a court refuses to enforce an agreement on the
grounds that it violates public policy, there may be nothing suspect about the
bargaining process.28 Instead, the court is basing its decision on the grounds that,
in the words of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “the interest in freedom
of contract is outweighed by some overriding interest of society.”29 Courts have
long claimed the authority to refuse to enforce agreements that are contrary to
public policy and have exercised that authority in numerous situations.30
However, they have also expressed hesitation about being too quick to resort to
policy grounds to void contracts lest the “unruly horse” of policy later take them
in directions they could not anticipate.31 The following sections discuss the
traditional rules governing contracts that offend public policy.
A. Unenforceability on Public Policy Grounds
Under the traditional formulation of the rule, courts will not enforce
contracts where the public policy against enforcement outweighs the interest in
enforcement.32 Thus, to use two obvious examples, contracts that call for the
performance of an intentional tort or that amount to an illegal restraint of trade
are unenforceable on public policy grounds.33 Traditionally, there have been two
primary justifications for this rule: (1) deterring parties from making such
contracts and (2) preserving the dignity of courts by preventing them from being
used to accomplish ends contrary to the public interest.34

27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, introductory note (1981).
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22.1, at 819
(4th ed. 1998) (listing public policy considerations used by courts and providing examples for each
policy).
31. Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C.P.).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1).
33. Id. § 178 cmt. d, illus. 9 & 10.
34. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 22.1, at 820; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 322 (3d ed. 1999) (noting the deterrence rationale for refusing to enforce
contracts on public policy grounds). See generally Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155, 160
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Viewing the parties as in pari delicto, we decline to serve as ‘paymaster of the
wages of crime, or referee between thieves.’” (quoting Stone v. Freeman, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (N.Y.
1948))).
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Defining the scope of this limitation on the enforcement of otherwise
enforceable agreements has proven difficult.35 Given the strong public policy in
favor of freedom of contract, courts sometimes demand a strong showing that the
countervailing public policy outweighs the interest in freedom of contract.36 This
sentiment is repeated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ admonition that
for an agreement to be unenforceable on public policy grounds, the interests in
enforcing the agreement must be “clearly outweighed” by a public policy against
enforcement.37 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts directs courts to consider
a host of factors in making this determination. When weighing the interest in
enforcing the disputed term, courts should consider “the parties’ justified
expectations, . . . any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied,
and . . . any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.”38
When weighing the public policy against enforcing the term, courts should
consider the following factors:
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it
was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.39
This balancing-of-factors approach is obviously not conducive to the
development of many bright-line rules. However, the comments contain some
potentially useful guidance for courts. When considering the strength of the
policy in question, a comment advises that not every piece of legislation
articulates a public policy substantial enough to outweigh other considerations.40
This is particularly likely “in the case of minor administrative regulations or
local ordinances that may not be indicative of the general welfare.”41 By
emphasizing that the policy must be indicative of the general welfare, the

35. See Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena, 386 A.2d 1216,
1228 (Md. 1978) (“[J]urists to this day have been unable to fashion a truly workable definition of
public policy.”).
36. Aurora Nat’l Life Assurance Co. v. Harrison, 462 F. Supp. 2d 951, 971 (S.D. Iowa 2006)
(stating that a “patently high standard” must be satisfied before a contract will be declared void on
public policy grounds).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (emphasis added); see also Harry G.
Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70
MINN. L. REV. 163, 182 (1985) (“[T]he whole of the Restatement is concerned with making private
agreements enforceable, and . . . public policy limits are among the exceptional limitations.” (citing
E. Allan Farnsworth, Discussion of Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts, Tentative Draft No.
12, 54 A.L.I. PROC. 54, 72–73 (1978))).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2).
39. Id. § 178(3).
40. Id. § 178 cmt. c.
41. Id.
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comment suggests that legislation designed to protect a narrow interest may be
too insubstantial to justify nonenforcement of a contractual term.
Ultimately, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the numerous courts
that have adopted its reasoning take a flexible approach to the question of
unenforceability on public policy grounds.42 The approach has allowed some
bright-line rules to develop, such as the rule that an exculpatory clause
eliminating liability for intentional torts or gross negligence is unenforceable.43
But it has also allowed courts to examine how the purposes underlying a stated
public policy would be affected by permitting enforcement of the agreement in a
given case.44
B. Recovery in Quantum Meruit or Restitution
Declaring an agreement unenforceable may have potentially harsh
consequences.45 When one party has conferred a benefit to another in the
absence of an enforceable agreement, the law sometimes permits that party to
recover the reasonable value of the services provided under a theory of quantum
meruit or restitution.46 Restitution in full or at least in part is the norm in
numerous situations in which a contract is unenforceable. Examples include
where one of the parties lacks mental capacity,47 where there has been a
unilateral mistake,48 and where an agreement fails to comply with the statute of
frauds.49 The difficult question that often arises is whether a party who has
performed under an agreement that is unenforceable on public policy grounds
may nonetheless recover in quantum meruit for the services provided.
One danger in voiding a contract on public policy grounds is that a
contracting party may use the doctrine as a shield to avoid payment and thereby
reap a windfall.50 In older decisions, courts often justified their conclusions as to
whether to permit recovery on a quantum meruit theory by inquiring whether the
contract in question was malum in se, in which case the agreement is void and

42. Prince, supra note 37, at 180–82.
43. Id. at 186; see also Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth
Activities—The Alternative to “Nerf®” Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 684 (1992) (“[E]ven
when an exculpatory agreement is otherwise generally valid, . . . most courts have held that such
agreements may not preclude liability for more extreme forms of negligence such as recklessness or
gross negligence.”).
44. See Prince, supra note 37, at 180 n.75 (citing cases as examples).
45. In order to offset the potentially harsh consequences of declaring a contract
unenforceable on policy grounds, courts sometimes resort to the rules concerning the severability of
unenforceable terms. See infra notes 186–210 and accompanying text.
46. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 2.20, at 103 (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1
(1937)).
47. Id. § 4.8, at 239.
48. Id. § 9.4, at 636.
49. Id. § 6.11, at 414.
50. McIntosh v. Mills, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66, 76 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Lewis & Queen v. N.
M. Ball Sons, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (Cal. 1957)).
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the performing party may not recover in quantum meruit, or malum prohibitum,
in which case the agreement may be void or voidable depending upon the nature
of the agreed-upon act and the court may permit recovery in quantum meruit.51
Other courts have rejected such distinctions and instead have decided restitution
issues on a case-by-case basis.52
The general rule of contract law is that quantum meruit recovery is not
available in the event a contract is unenforceable on public policy grounds.53 For
example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts takes the position that
restitution should be the exception, rather than the norm, in the event that a term
is unenforceable on public policy grounds.54 Professor Dan Dobbs has explained
the justification for this presumption:
If restitution were granted, this may in some situations, prove
tantamount to enforcement. At the very least, it would provide a floor or
cushion on which an illegal actor might fall back, sure that if his illegal
conduct were not challenged, he could profit by it, and that if it were
challenged, he could at least get his money or property back. This would
no doubt encourage such illegal contracts. In quite a few situations,
then, it seems proper to deny both enforcement of the bargain on a
contract basis and restitution. Though a denial of restitution leads . . . to

51. See, e.g., Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (Ct. App. 1973)
(“The courts often make a distinction between acts which are malum in se and those which are
malum prohibitum . . . .”); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d 444, 446 (La. 1974) (allowing
recovery where “[t]he transactions were not malum in se but merely malum prohibitum”);
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 22.1, at 822 (“[A] party who has performed under the
agreement tainted with illegality may recover if the offense is merely malum prohibitum ‘and the
denial of relief is wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public policy or appropriate
individual punishment.’” (quoting John E. Rosaco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 11 N.E.2d 908, 909
(N.Y. 1937))).
52. See Cimmino v. Town of Trumbull, No. 293612, 1994 WL 76859, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Feb. 28, 1994) (“Generally, a contract made in violation of a statute is illegal and unenforceable,
and it is usually immaterial whether the thing forbidden by statute is malum in se or malum
prohibitum.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 22.8, at 833 (stating “the general rule that
the court leaves the parties to an illegal bargain where it finds them” and that quantum meruit
recovery is usually not permitted); FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 5.9, at 357 (“Courts generally do
not grant restitution under agreements that are unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”); 8
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:76, at
576 (4th ed. 1998) (“It is the general rule that where a contract is either partially or wholly illegal,
not even a quasi-contractual recovery is available.”).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1981) (“Except as stated in §§ 198 and
199, a party has no claim in restitution for performance that he has rendered under or in return for a
promise that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless denial of restitution would cause
disproportionate forfeiture.”).
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unjust enrichment, this has generally been deemed a less weighty
consideration than the policy of discouraging illegal bargains.55
In short, the general rule is that, where a strong public policy is well-established
and clearly articulated, quantum meruit recovery is inappropriate, lest future
wrongdoing of a similar nature be encouraged.56
Restitution, therefore, is only appropriate in a limited number of situations,
such as where denial of restitution would result in disproportionate forfeiture.57
Importantly, according to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the forfeiture
must be “disproportionate in relation to the contravention of public policy
involved” before restitution is appropriate.58 Therefore, the fact that the other
party to the transaction receives the benefit of the bargain without paying for that
benefit does not necessarily render a forfeiture disproportionate. In deciding
whether forfeiture would be disproportionate to the public policy at issue, the
Restatement directs courts to consider “such factors as the extent of the party’s
deliberate involvement in any misconduct, the gravity of that misconduct, and
the strength of the public policy.”59
There are several other common exceptions that permit a party to recover the
reasonable value of services provided,60 the most relevant of which, for purposes
of this Article, is the situation in which the party seeking restitution was
“excusably ignorant” of the facts or of the prohibition on the conduct.61 This
exception is likely to apply only where the party seeking restitution is “ignorant
of legislation of a minor character from which the policy is derived,” such as
legislation “of a local, specialized or technical nature.”62 However, the fact that
the legislation is of a minor character will not be enough to excuse the ignorance
where the party seeking restitution has specialized knowledge of the field.63

55. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 13.5, at 995 (1973).
56. See Dupree v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 247 N.W. 97, 101 (Mich. 1933)).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197.
58. Id. cmt. b (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. These exceptions include where the party seeking restitution was not equally in the
wrong with the other party, id. § 198(b), where the party seeking restitution withdrew from the
transaction before the improper purpose was achieved, id. § 199(a), or when allowance of the claim
for restitution “would put an end to a continuing situation that is contrary to the public interest,” id.
§ 199(b), such as permitting a stakeholder to retain money obtained as part of an illegal wager, id.
cmt. b. See also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 22.7 (discussing situations in which
restitution is appropriate).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 198(a).
62. Id. § 180 cmt. a; see id. § 198 cmt. a.
63. Id. § 180 cmt. b.
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III. AN ATTORNEY’S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION UNDER A FEE AGREEMENT
THAT VIOLATES ETHICAL RULES: THE VIEW OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
As its name suggests, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers aspires “to restate much of the law governing lawyers.”64 As the authors
recognized, the Restatement “represents something of a departure in . . . focusing
as it does on a specific vocation.”65 As discussed below, the Restatement’s
articulation of the standards governing fee agreements that offend public policy
also represents something of a departure from the normal rules governing
contract law.
A. General Rules
Agreements

Regarding

Unenforceable

Attorney–Client

Fee

The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers articulates a general
rule providing for quantum meruit recovery in the event that a fee agreement is
unenforceable: “If a client and lawyer have not made a valid contract providing
for another measure of compensation, a client owes a lawyer who has performed
legal services for the client the fair value of the lawyer’s services.”66 In such
cases, a lawyer is entitled to quantum meruit recovery unless the lawyer has
engaged in a “clear and serious violation of duty to a client.”67 Where the lawyer
has engaged in such a violation, forfeiture of some or all of the lawyer’s
compensation is appropriate in order to deter future misconduct and as a
recognition that the lawyer’s misconduct “destroys or severely impairs the clientlawyer relationship and thereby the justification of the lawyer’s claim to
compensation.”68
A violation of duty is “clear,” according to the Restatement, where “a
reasonable lawyer, knowing the relevant facts and law reasonably accessible to
the lawyer, would have known that the conduct was wrongful.”69 A violation of
duty must also be “serious” to justify complete or partial fee forfeiture.70 “Minor
violations,” according to the Restatement, “do not justify leaving the lawyer
entirely unpaid for valuable services rendered to a client, although some such
violations will reduce the size of the fee.”71 Ultimately, the amount, if any, of fee
forfeiture that is appropriate for a violation of a duty to a client depends upon a

64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS intro. at 3 (2000).
65. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS, at xxi, xxi (2000).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39.
67. Id. § 37.
68. Id. cmt. b.
69. Id. cmt. d.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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number of factors, including “the gravity and timing of the violation, its
willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer’s work for the client, any other
threatened or actual harm to the client, and the adequacy of other remedies.”72
The black letter rule of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers and the accompanying commentary contain a great deal of lawyerly
hedging on the questions of when fee forfeiture is appropriate and to what extent
it is appropriate.73 As Professor Perillo observes, however, “[O]ne thing about
the provision is clear; it is lawyer-friendly.”74 Perillo explains as follows:
Even if the lawyer engages in a “clear and serious violation of a duty to
the client,” the lawyer may be entitled to some or all of the agreed fee or
quantum meruit. . . . After many re-readings of the Restatement section,
one concludes that all its verbiage simply states that the courts have total
discretion on the question of whether the lawyer is entitled to
compensation despite a violation of the lawyer’s duties to the client.75
Thus, even in the case of a ‘“clear and serious violation of a duty to a client,’”
recovery, either under the contract or in quantum meruit, remains a possibility
for a lawyer.76 As Professor Perillo points out, “[o]ther fiduciaries are not so
privileged.”77
Unlike the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers fails to establish a presumption against restitution in the
event of unenforceability on policy grounds.78 In fact, the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers establishes the opposite presumption, providing that
a client owes the lawyer the fair value of his services despite the unenforceability
of the contract.79 A lawyer should only be deprived of the reasonable value of his
services when he has engaged in a clear and serious violation of a duty to a
client, and then, perhaps only a partial forfeiture is appropriate.80 In support of
this presumption, the drafters offer perhaps the simplest of justifications: the

72. Id. § 37.
73. According to Professor Perillo, the relevant section “has the clarity of the Milky Way as
seen during a thermal inversion.” Perillo, supra note 1, at 447.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 447–48 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
76. Id. at 447 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
77. Id. at 448.
78. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1981) (denying restitution
where contract is unenforceable per public policy), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 (2000) (allowing restitution in the absence of a valid legal fee
agreement).
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39.
80. See id. §§ 37, 39 & cmt. a.
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parties to a contract usually expect that the party providing services to the other
will be paid for those services.81
The rule from the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is
lawyer-friendly in another way. The rule focuses almost exclusively on the
relationship between lawyer and client.82 Largely omitted from consideration is
the public’s interest in whether the lawyer is compensated.83 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts directs courts to take into account the public’s interest
both when considering whether to enforce the contractual term that allegedly
violates public policy and when considering whether to permit restitution in the
event the term is unenforceable.84 For example, one exception to the rule that
restitution is inappropriate when a provision is unenforceable on policy grounds
is that restitution is appropriate when forfeiture would be “disproportionate in
relation to the contravention of public policy involved.”85 Thus, the strength of
the public’s interest in preventing a party to a contract from engaging in a
particular course of conduct may tip the balance for or against allowing recovery.
In contrast, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is
focused almost exclusively on the parties to the contract—the lawyer and the
client.86 The black letter rule and comments repeatedly stress that the focus
should be on the parties to the fee agreement.87 One comment specifically
disavows the harm a third party may suffer as a result of the lawyer–client
relationship as being a factor in deciding whether a lawyer should be entitled to
recover the fair value of her services.88 Thus, according to the drafters, the
interests of third parties and the public more generally are not part of the
analysis.
By focusing solely on the lawyer’s duty to the client, the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers generally makes it more difficult to

81. Id. § 39 cmt. b(i).
82. See id. cmt. a.
83. See id.
84. See supra notes 39 & 59 and accompanying text.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. b (1981) (emphasis added); see also
id. cmt. a (“In general, if a court will not, on grounds of public policy, aid a promisee by enforcing
the promise, it will not aid him by granting him restitution for performance that he has rendered in
return for the unenforceable promise.”); id. § 198 cmt. b (explaining that a party claiming restitution
can be considered “less in the wrong” and therefore entitled to restitution “because the public policy
is intended to protect persons of the class to which he belongs and, as a member of that protected
class, he is regarded as less culpable”). The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
also provide that the exception permitting restitution in the event the other party is equally in the
wrong “is not usually available to a claimant whose misconduct is serious when viewed in the light
of the threatened social harm.” Id.; see also id. § 199(b) (permitting restitution when “allowance of
the claim would put an end to a continuing situation that is contrary to the public interest”).
86. The only real hint that societal interests may be relevant appears in the comments, in
which the authors note briefly that forfeiture may be a deterrent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 cmts. a & b.
87. See id. cmts. a–e.
88. Id. cmt. c (“The Section refers only to duties that a lawyer owes to a client, not to those
owed to other persons.”).
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deprive a lawyer of all or part of his fee. When one turns a blind eye to the larger
interests of the public, it will often become more difficult to justify forfeiture.
For example, the comments suggest that actual harm to the client flowing from
the breach, while not a requirement, should ordinarily occur before forfeiture is
appropriate unless the violation is “flagrant.”89 Similarly, the comments explain
that “[n]ormally, forfeiture is more appropriate for repeated or continuing
violations than for a single incident.”90 Apparently, this is true despite the
strength of the public’s interest in preventing the violation from occurring in the
first place.
Depending upon the facts of a case, a decision to permit a lawyer to recover
for the reasonable value of services provided may greatly influence the amount
of money the lawyer ultimately collects. In some cases, a lawyer’s recovery is
reduced dramatically.91 In other instances, however, lawyers have received only
slightly less than they would have received under an enforceable agreement.92
B. The Extent to Which the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys Can
Articulate Public Policy
Courts have sometimes differed in their conclusions as to which sources are
capable of articulating public policy for purposes of contract law.93 The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts identifies “legislation” as a source of public
policy.94 However, the comments explain that “[t]he term ‘legislation’ is used
here in the broadest sense to include any fixed text enacted by a body with

89. See id. cmt. d (“[A] lawyer’s failure to keep a client’s funds segregated in a separate
account should not result in forfeiture if the funds are preserved undiminished for the client. But
forfeiture is justified for a flagrant violation even though no harm can be proved.” (internal citation
omitted)).
90. Id.
91. See Gaines, Gaines & Gaines, P.C. v. Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, 554 So. 2d 445,
446–47 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (permitting a law firm to recover in quantum meruit where the fee
agreement was unenforceable, resulting in the law firm receiving $7,500 for services rendered rather
than the 12.5% of the ultimate $1.5 million recovery as called for under the fee agreement).
92. See Mulhern v. Roach, 494 N.E.2d 1327, 1330–31, 1334–35 (Mass. 1986) (refusing to
enforce one-third contingency fee agreement but allowing lawyer to recover, in quantum meruit,
almost one-third of what client recovered). Sometimes, of course, a lawyer will receive far less in
quantum meruit than the lawyer would have been entitled to receive under the fee agreement but
still receive more than what a reasonable fee at the low end of the reasonableness scale would be in
such a case. For example, in Thompson v. Thompson, 319 S.E.2d 315, 319 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984),
rev’d on other grounds, 328 S.E.2d 288 (N.C. 1985), the law firm would have been entitled to
collect $250,000 had its contingency fee agreement been enforceable. An expert concluded that,
“using the relevant hourly basis as a guide, a reasonable fee would [have been] at least $20,000.” Id.
Ultimately, the trial court set $85,000 as the reasonable fee. Id.
93. For a discussion of the extent to which the rules of professional conduct governing
attorneys may articulate public policy for purposes of a tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy, see Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing
Attorneys, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1043 (2008).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
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authority to promulgate rules, including not only statutes, but constitutions and
local ordinances, as well as administrative regulations issued pursuant to
them.”95
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ approach, the ethical rules
governing lawyers should qualify as “legislation” capable of articulating public
policy.96 Because the rules are adopted by a state’s highest court pursuant to its
authority to regulate the legal profession, they should ordinarily qualify as a
source of public policy.97 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers similarly takes the position that a violation of an ethical rule of the legal
profession may result in forfeiture of the lawyer’s fee because the ethical rules
are a source of a lawyer’s duty to a client.98
The language appearing in the introductory Scope of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct somewhat complicates the matter. The Scope emphasizes
the disciplinary character of the Rules and cautions that “violation of a Rule does
not necessarily warrant any . . . nondisciplinary remedy.”99 A few courts have
seized on this language and have consequently been reluctant to invalidate fee
agreements that violate the ethical rules.100

95. Id. cmt. a. Some courts take a more restrictive approach, limiting the sources of public
policy to statutes, constitutional provisions, or perhaps common law. See Adler v. Am. Standard
Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981) (“[R]ecognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a
basis for a judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a
given case, and . . . declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch.”);
In re Estate of Walker, 476 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. 1985) (“‘[W]hen we speak of the public policy
of the state, we mean the law of the state, whether found in the Constitution, the statutes or judicial
records.’” (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Hawkins, 51 N.E. 257, 260 (N.Y. 1898)));
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (“The public policy must be
evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision.”). Other courts take a more expansive view.
For example, one court has declared agreements between a sports agent and college athletes
unenforceable primarily because the agreements violated several rules of the constitution of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private, voluntary organization. Walters v.
Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. a.
97. See Long, supra note 93, at 1081–82 (citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 2.2.2, at 24 (1986)).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 cmt. c (2000).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope para. 20 (2009).
100. It bears mentioning that these decisions often involve disputes between two lawyers
rather than between a lawyer and a client, see, e.g., Freeman v. Mayer, 95 F.3d 569, 575–76 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Trotter v. Nelson, 657 N.E.2d 426, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), vacated, 684 N.E.2d
1150, 1155 (Ind. 1997)) (applying Indiana law in support of the idea that an attorney should not be
permitted to use the ethics rules as a shield to avoid the terms of a fee-sharing agreement between
two lawyers); Gagne v. Vaccaro, 766 A.2d 416, 424–25 (Conn. 2001) (citing CONN. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Scope at 3 (2000)) (noting that, in a dispute between two attorneys, one attorney
could not use the other attorney’s violation of the ethics rules as a basis for avoiding terms of a fee
agreement), or disputes involving a stranger to the original fee agreement who seeks to use the fact
that the agreement violated the ethical rules as an excuse for avoiding liability, see, e.g., Cross v.
Am. Country Ins. Co., 875 F.2d 625, 628–29 (7th Cir. 1989) (involving an effort by an insurance
company accused of tortiously interfering with a lawyer’s contingency fee agreement with a client
to avoid liability by asserting that the lawyer’s failure to abide by the ethical rule regarding oral
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Most courts, however, have agreed with the authors of the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and have generally refused, on policy
grounds, to enforce fee agreements that run afoul of the ethical rules governing
attorneys.101 Some courts have paused to reflect on the matter and have expressly
held that the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers represent an
expression of public policy and that a fee agreement that violates one of those
rules is unenforceable.102 Other courts have stopped short of formally
recognizing a lawyer’s ethics code as a source of public policy but have
nonetheless refused, in the name of public policy, to enforce fee agreements that
violate such rules.103
IV. THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF ATTORNEY–CLIENT FEE AGREEMENTS THAT
VIOLATE THE ETHICAL RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEYS
There are numerous ethical rules that regulate attorney–client fee
agreements. Courts have generally shown a reluctance either to declare
agreements that fail to comply with these rules unenforceable on policy grounds
or, more commonly, to preclude the possibility of recovery in quantum meruit.
Instead, courts have tended to exercise the broad discretion the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers describes and have permitted at least
some type of recovery. In short, the fact that an attorney–client agreement
violates the ethical rules governing lawyers will not typically bar an attorney
from recovering at least on a quantum meruit basis—despite the traditional
contract rule to the contrary.104
A. Fee Agreements that Fail to Comply with Ethical Rules that Expressly
Regulate Fee Agreements
There are several ethical rules that speak directly to attorney–client fee
agreements. These include the rules against charging an unreasonable fee,105

contingency fees rendered the agreement unenforceable), overruled by Kaplan v. Pavalon &
Gifford, 12 F.3d 87, 90–91 (7th Cir. 1993).
101. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 454 (stating that while the ethical rules regarding
unreasonable and clearly excessive fees are disciplinary rules, “courts have generally regarded them
also as rules of contract law”).
102. United States v. 36.06 Acres of Land, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (D.N.M. 1999); Post v.
Bregman, 707 A.2d 806, 818 (Md. 1998).
103. See Harvard Farms, Inc. v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 617 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993),
disapproved of in Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 185 (Fla. 1995). A few courts have
relied on the older malum in se–malum prohibitum distinction and have concluded that a violation
of some ethical rules governing fee agreements does not per se violate public policy. See Daynard v.
Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12–13 (D. Mass. 2001).
104. See King v. Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf, P.A., 709 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (“When a fee agreement between attorney and client fails to comply with the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar, the attorney is entitled to recover on the basis of quantum meruit.”).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2009).
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charging a contingent fee in a divorce proceeding,106 and entering into an oral
contingency fee agreement.107 In most instances, a lawyer who violates one of
these rules can nonetheless expect to receive some type of compensation for the
services provided to the client under the unethical fee agreement.
1. Unreasonable Fees
One example of where contract law is, on its face, stricter on lawyers than
nonlawyers is the situation in which a lawyer charges an unreasonable or clearly
excessive fee. Under traditional contract law principles, the fact that one party
agreed to grossly overpay for goods or services is typically not enough to excuse
that party from paying.108 Only where there is some problem, such as fraud,109 in
the bargaining process or where the agreement is unconscionable, which also
typically involves some serious procedural concerns, is a party likely to be
excused after entering into a bad deal.110 With an attorney–client fee agreement,
however, a client may be able to avoid payment of legal fees on the grounds that
the agreed-upon fee is merely “unreasonable” under the jurisdiction’s legal
ethics code.111 Sometimes a statute will place a ceiling on the fees a lawyer may

106. Id. R. 1.5(d)(1).
107. Id. R. 1.5(c). Two ethical rules speak to fee-splitting arrangements. Model Rule 1.5(e)
places limits on the ability of a lawyer to enter into a fee-splitting or referral arrangement with
another lawyer. See id. R. 1.5(e). There are numerous cases involving one lawyer seeking to recover
from another lawyer who was a party to an arrangement that violated a jurisdiction’s applicable
ethical rule. See J.G. Wahlert, Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of Express Fee-Splitting
Agreements Between Attorneys, 11 A.L.R.6th 587 (2006) (collecting cases). Similarly, Model Rule
5.4(a) prohibits a lawyer from sharing a fee with a nonlawyer. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 5.4(a). There are also cases in which a fee agreement that fails to comply with this ethical rule
remains enforceable. See, e.g., “We the People” Paralegal Servs., L.L.C. v. Watley, 766 So. 2d 744,
748–49 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing for recovery even though the fee-splitting arrangement
violated Rule 5.4(e)). In addition, Model Rule 5.6(b) prohibits a lawyer from entering into a
settlement agreement in which the lawyer agrees not to represent another client against the
defendant. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b); see Jarvis v. Jarvis, 758 P.2d 244, 247
(Kan. Ct. App. 1988) (declaring such agreements void as against public policy). Because the vast
majority of these cases do not involve a client seeking to avoid payment of fees to an attorney, these
cases are, by and large, beyond the scope of this Article.
108. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 453–54.
109. See id. (explaining that, in the absence of fraud or the like, courts generally do not inquire
into the adequacy of consideration).
110. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-7, at
168 (5th ed. 2000) (“[M]ost courts seem to require a certain quantum of procedural, plus a certain
quantum of substantive, unconscionability.”).
111. See, e.g., Hauptman, O’Brien, Wolf & Lathrop, P.C. v. Turco, 735 N.W.2d 368, 374
(Neb. 2007) (citing Brown & Sturm v. Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 768 A.2d 62, 79 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2001); Kirby v. Liska, 334 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Neb. 1983)) (discussing whether fee that client
agreed to was so excessive as to make the contract unenforceable).
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charge a client.112 More prevalent, however, is the prohibition on unreasonable
fees contained in Model Rule 1.5(a).113
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) older Model Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibited attorneys from charging “clearly excessive” fees.114
The Ethical Considerations accompanying the rule explained the public’s interest
in the rule: “A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee, for
excessive cost of legal service would deter laymen from utilizing the legal
system in protection of their rights. Furthermore, an excessive charge abuses the
professional relationship between lawyer and client.”115 Although the Model
Code and Model Rules use slightly different terminology, both address the same
evil.
Model Rule 1.5(a) lists eight factors to consider in determining whether a fee
is reasonable:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.116
In most instances, fee agreements that establish unreasonable or clearly
excessive fees present a situation in which the public interest against such
agreements clearly outweighs the opposing public interest in freedom of
contract. Unlike parties who negotiate fee agreements at arm’s length, the

112. See Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2009)
(involving an attorney who negotiated a settlement and made a fee request that exceeded the amount
permitted by statute); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Golomb, 606 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (involving an attorney who charged fees in medical malpractice cases that exceeded the
statutory cap).
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2009).
114. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1980).
115. Id. EC 2-17 (footnote omitted).
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a).
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attorney–client relationship is a fiduciary relationship;117 thus, a lawyer who
charges an unreasonable or clearly excessive fee has taken advantage of a
fiduciary. This concern is particularly acute in light of the fact that many clients
lack information about fees for legal services and are at a marked disadvantage
in the negotiation process.118
Moreover, these cases also directly implicate the policy concerns underlying
the presumption against restitution where an agreement has been declared to be
unenforceable on policy grounds. Many clients will be unlikely to contest such
agreements, if for no other reason than that they will probably have to hire
another lawyer to pursue the matter.119 In contrast, the costs to the original
lawyer in defending the action will usually be minimal.120 Even when a client is
successful in challenging a fee agreement, permitting a lawyer to recover on a
quantum meruit basis may provide the type of safety net that will encourage
lawyers to continue drafting unreasonable fee agreements in the future.121 Thus,
permitting recovery in quantum meruit would seem to do little to deter attorneys
from charging unreasonable fees in violation of their ethical obligations and
might actually encourage such behavior.
Indeed, in some instances, courts have relied on this logic in refusing to
permit a lawyer to recover even the reasonable value of the services after the
lawyer charged the client an unreasonable or clearly excessive fee. In White v.
McBride,122 the Tennessee Supreme Court had to decide whether a lawyer who
had charged a contingency fee in an estate case was entitled to any recovery for
his services.123 The attorney entered into a fee agreement with regard to the
estate of his client’s late wife.124 The agreement provided that the attorney “was
to be paid a $2,500 retainer plus one-third of gross recovery above and in excess
of retainer.”125 Eventually, the attorney sought to recover $108,291, which was
approximately one-third the value of the estate.126 The probate court ruled that
the one-third contingency fee was “clearly excessive,” in part because the
attorney assumed no real risk of nonrecovery in the matter.127 However, the
probate court concluded that the attorney could still recover on a theory of
quantum meruit in the amount of $12,500.128 On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld the finding that the fee was clearly excessive but also held that the

117. Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problem of Unethical
Billing Practices by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV. 63, 78 (2008).
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (2000).
119. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 457.
120. Id.
121. See DOBBS, supra note 55, § 13.5, at 995.
122. 937 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1996).
123. Id. at 797.
124. Id.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 799.
127. See id. at 799, 801.
128. Id. at 799.
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attorney was not entitled to recover under a quantum meruit theory.129 The
attorney’s ethical violation was “of a most flagrant sort as it goes directly to the
heart of the fiduciary relationship that exists between attorney and client.”130
Permitting an attorney to recover anything under those circumstances “would
encourage attorneys to enter exorbitant fee contracts, secure that the safety net of
quantum meruit is there in case of a subsequent fall.”131
Not all courts have taken this approach, however. At least one court has
suggested that a fee agreement that establishes a fee in excess of a statutory cap
is not per se unenforceable.132 In a few cases, courts have permitted quantum
meruit recovery where the fee agreement was held to be unenforceable because
the fee charged was clearly excessive or unreasonable, sometimes with no
explanation as to why quantum meruit recovery was appropriate.133 By failing to
offer any explanation for permitting quantum meruit recovery, these decisions
effectively eliminate the presumption established in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts against an award of restitution in the event a contract is unenforceable
on policy grounds and replace it with the presumption in favor of compensation
contained in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.134
Although other courts have refused to permit quantum meruit recovery in the
case of unreasonable fees, these cases sometimes involve additional factors upon
which courts have relied to deny recovery. For example, the Nebraska Supreme
Court denied a lawyer any type of recovery, in part, because the lawyer did not
reduce the excessive contingent fee agreement to writing.135 The failure to put
the agreement in writing was not, by itself, a violation of Nebraska’s ethical
rules at the time, but it did, under prior decisions, require the attorney to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he had disclosed all material terms and
that the client had agreed to them.136 The lawyer’s failure to establish this
requirement helped the court justify its decision not to allow recovery in
quantum meruit.137
Despite the strong public interests implicated when an attorney charges an
unreasonable fee, not every case justifies total forfeiture. For example, the Iowa
Supreme Court permitted a defense lawyer to recover the reasonable value of his

129. Id. at 801, 803.
130. Id. at 803.
131. Id.
132. Anderson v. Anchor Org. for Health Maint., 654 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
133. See Krause v. Rhodes, 640 F.2d 214, 218–19 (6th Cir. 1981); Brillhart v. Hudson, 455
P.2d 878, 881 (Colo. 1969). Some courts justify recovery on quantum meruit grounds on the older
malum in se–malum prohibitum distinction. See Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291
N.W.2d 331, 337 (Iowa 1980) (concluding that an attorney was entitled to compensation in
quantum meruit because the contract was “not invalid because of illegality of the services” and
because attorney provided valuable services to client).
134. See supra Parts II.B, III.A.
135. Kirby v. Liska, 334 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Neb. 1983).
136. Id. at 182 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2–19, EC 2–20 (1980)).
137. Id. at 183.
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services despite the fact that the method used to compute his fee, which was
based on a percentage of the difference between the amount prayed for in the
petition and the amount actually awarded, was unreasonable and the fee
agreement unenforceable.138 According to the court, this was the first time it had
considered the question of the permissibility of that type of fee agreement.139
Although the court ultimately concluded that such agreements are void, the
case presents one of the few situations in which a lawyer could plausibly assert
the “excusable ignorance” exception contained in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts that permits recovery in quantum meruit despite the unenforceability
of a contractual provision.140 Indeed, given the ABA’s subsequent conclusion in
a formal ethics opinion that, contrary to the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision,
there is nothing per se inappropriate about such fee agreements,141 the attorney’s
argument for quantum meruit recovery seems much stronger. What is
noteworthy about the decision, however, is that the court makes no allusion to
the excusable ignorance exception or the other applicable exceptions allowing
for recovery of the reasonable value of the services provided.142 Instead, the
court appears to have proceeded from the assumption that unless there is
something illegal about the contract itself, quantum meruit recovery should be
the presumption, despite the strong public interests at stake.143
2. Contingency Fees in Domestic Relations Cases
One of the most striking examples of the courts’ tendency to rule that
conduct that offends the policies underlying the rules of professional conduct for
attorneys is not sufficiently offensive so as to deprive an attorney of the ability to
recover fees lies in cases involving contingent fee agreements in divorce cases.
Model Rule 1.5(d)(1) prohibits an attorney from entering into a fee agreement in
a domestic relations case, “the payment or amount of which is contingent upon
the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property
settlement in lieu thereof.”144 The policy underlying the rule is one of
“encourag[ing] reconciliation by removing any incentive to the attorney to press
forward with the divorce.”145

138. See Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d at 337.
139. Id. at 333 (“No case has involved a contingent defense fee predicated on a percentage of
the amount saved under the prayer in defending an unliquidated tort claim.”).
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 198(a) (1981).
141. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373 (1993).
142. See Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331.
143. See id. at 337 (explaining that lawyers were entitled to recover the reasonable value of the
services they provided because they provided valuable services and because “[t]he contract [was
not] invalid because of illegality of the services but merely [invalid] because on policy grounds [the
court could not] approve the way in which the fee was to be calculated”).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(1) (2009).
145. Guenard v. Burke, 443 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass. 1982) (citing McInerney v. Massasoit
Greyhound Ass’n, 269 N.E.2d 211, 218 (Mass. 1971)).
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Courts refused to enforce contingent fee agreements in these instances well
before the organized bar adopted formal codes of ethics.146 The Minnesota
Supreme Court once remarked that these agreements were so offensive to public
policy that “they must be eradicated from our practice,” even if it meant refusing
to permit an attorney to recover under a quantum meruit theory.147 Indeed, courts
rarely hesitate to declare agreements in violation of this rule unenforceable as a
matter of law.148
Despite the public’s obviously strong interest in preserving marriage, the
majority of courts nonetheless permit an attorney who is in violation of the rule
to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered in most instances.149 In
some instances, courts simply adopt a blanket approach that, while deeming such
agreements void as against public policy, permits an attorney to recover in
quantum meruit.150 This is often done with little or no explanation of the court’s
reasoning.151 Again, this approach amounts to a reversing of the traditional
presumption against quantum meruit recovery in the event a contract is
unenforceable on policy grounds.
Other courts simply rely on the notion that basic fairness demands that the
attorney should be compensated for the services rendered.152 At least one court
has permitted recovery in quantum meruit where the contract was not executed
until after the parties established an attorney–client relationship for the purpose

146. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Dillon, 98 N.W. 746, 747–48 (Mich. 1904) (holding “that portion
of the contract providing for a percentage of what should be recovered in [a] divorce case”
unenforceable); Lynde v. Lynde, 52 A. 694, 702 (N.J. 1902) (“[A]limony . . . cannot be subjected in
advance to a charge in favor of the solicitor through whose services it is awarded . . . .”).
147. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762, 773 (Minn. 1956) (citing McCarthy v.
Santangelo, 78 A.2d 240, 241 (Conn. 1951)).
148. See, e.g., Ownby v. Prisock, 138 So. 2d 279, 280 (Miss. 1962) (holding that the
contingent fee agreement was enforceable but that valuable services were rendered, and therefore,
attorney was entitled to reasonable payment based on quantum meruit).
149. Hay v. Erwin, 419 P.2d 32, 34 (Or. 1966) (stating that the majority of courts have so
held); see also King v. Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf, P.A., 709 So. 2d 572, 573–74 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the bonus provision in a fee agreement that made the fee charged by a
firm in a dissolution action contingent upon the results obtained was unenforceable but that the firm
was still entitled to quantum meruit recovery in the amount of $342,989). Recovery in quantum
meruit also appears to have been fairly common in older cases as well. See McCurdy, 98 N.W. at
748; Lynde, 52 A. at 703.
150. See King, 709 So. 2d at 574 (“When a fee agreement between attorney and client fails to
comply with the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, the attorney is entitled to recover on the basis of
quantum meruit.”).
151. See Coons v. Kary, 69 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (Ct. App. 1968) (citing Wiley v. Silsbee, 36
P.2d 854, 854–55 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934); Ayres v. Lipschutz, 228 P. 720, 721 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1924)) (stating, without explanation, that attorney was “clearly entitled” to recover value of
his services).
152. See Thompson v. Thompson, 319 S.E.2d 315, 322 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (“[W]e believe
that considerations of basic fairness argue in favor of allowing recovery in quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of the discharged law firm’s services as of the date of discharge.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 328 S.E.2d 288 (N.C. 1985).
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of obtaining a divorce; thus, the “taint of illegality” only permeated part of the
attorney–client relationship.153
Given the law’s longstanding abhorrence of these types of fee agreements, a
court could not rely on the exception permitting quantum meruit recovery where
the lawyer seeking recovery was excusably ignorant of the prohibition.154 Absent
unusual circumstances, the only possible exception to the traditional presumption
against restitution that might apply would be the disproportionate forfeiture
exception.155 Indeed, when courts do offer an explanation as to why they permit
an attorney to recover in quantum meruit, they often rely on the potential loss to
the attorney and the windfall to the client if no recovery was permitted.156
But by only taking into account the interests of lawyers and their clients,
courts tend to give little weight to the public’s strong interest in not placing
attorneys in the position where they have an incentive to discourage
reconciliation.157 Because under the approach of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, a forfeiture must be disproportionate in relation to the public policy at
stake before quantum meruit is appropriate,158 it would seem that recovery in
such cases would be the exception. A handful of courts have, in fact, concluded
that the policy justifications compelling the conclusion that agreements that
violate Model Rule 1.5(d)(1) are unenforceable also compel the conclusion that
no recovery may be had in quantum meruit.159 Thus, “[the public’s] interest in
the preservation of the marital relationship is so strong as to outweigh . . .
concerns that the [client] may have been unjustly enriched.”160 Yet, the majority
of courts have permitted attorneys to recover for the value of their services
despite the fact that their fee agreements conflict with the public policy
articulated in Rule 1.5(d)(1).161

153. Id. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson,
P.A. v. Smith, 498 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (severing the offending clause and
enforcing the remainder of the fee agreement).
154. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. But see Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689,
693 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that contingent fees are “begrudgingly permitted in domestic relations
cases” but “are subjected to enhanced scrutiny and rarely . . . justified”).
155. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Guenard v. Burke, 443 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass. 1982) (“The loss to the
defendant of a reasonable fee and the windfall to the plaintiff in being relieved of the obligation to
pay any attorney’s fee for the defendant’s proper services indicate that denial of a fair fee would be
unreasonable in the circumstances.” (citing Town Planning & Eng’g Assocs. v. Amesbury Specialty
Co., 342 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Mass. 1975))).
157. See Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn. 1956) (“[T]he continuance of
the marriage relation is deemed essential to the public welfare . . . .”).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. b (1981).
159. See In re Marriage of Malec, 562 N.E.2d 1010, 1021–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citing
Licciardi v. Collins, 536 N.E.2d 840, 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)); Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d at 773
(citing McCarthy v. Santangelo, 78 A.2d 240, 242 (Conn. 1951)).
160. Malec, 562 N.E.2d at 1021.
161. See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.
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3. Oral Contingent Fees
Another recurring issue involving fee agreements is the extent to which an
attorney is entitled to compensation where the attorney enters into a contingency
fee agreement that the attorney does not reduce to writing as required by a
jurisdiction’s ethical rules. ABA Model Rule 1.5(c) permits an attorney to charge
a contingent fee but requires that the agreement be in a writing signed by the
client.162 Although often the subject of intense criticism, contingent fees have
been justified on the grounds that they allow individuals with limited financial
resources to obtain legal representation they otherwise would not be able to
obtain.163 Contingent fees are, in the words of one court, “the ‘poor man’s key to
the courthouse door.’”164 As the client in a contingent fee case will often be
legally unsophisticated, the need to police such agreements is greater.165
Accordingly, the purposes behind requiring contingency fee agreements to be in
a writing signed by the client are to prevent misunderstanding and fraud.166
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers addresses this
scenario in at least two comments. In one comment, the authors opine that the
failure of a lawyer to put a fee agreement in writing as required by an ethics rule
does not make the agreement unenforceable—at least where the client does not
dispute the amount owed.167 In another comment, the authors opine that even
when an oral contingency fee agreement is unenforceable, courts should permit
recovery in quantum meruit because the law presumes that both the lawyer and

162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2009). The full text of the rule is as
follows:
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered,
except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A
contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that
shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other
expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly
notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the
client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall
provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.
Id.
163. See Cross v. Am. Country Ins. Co., 875 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Leonard
C. Arnold, Ltd. v. N. Trust Co., 506 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (Ill. 1987)), overruled on other grounds by
Kaplan v. Pavalon & Gifford, 12 F.3d 87, 90–91 (7th Cir. 1993).
164. Id. (citing Arnold, 506 N.E.2d at 1281) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 65 (1989) (stating that most personal injury clients are “not
legally sophisticated and do not have access to legal counsel to evaluate the proposed contingent fee
retainer agreement”).
166. Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d 238, 243 (N.J. 2002)
(citing DeGraaff v. Fusco, 660 A.2d 9, 11–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. g (2000).
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the client usually expect that the client will pay for legal services.168 According
to the Restatement, “[q]uantum meruit recovery then provides compensation in
circumstances in which it would be contrary to the parties’ expectation to
deprive the lawyer of all compensation.”169
Most courts have held that oral contingency fee agreements in violation of
the jurisdiction’s ethical rules are unenforceable in violation of public policy but
that a lawyer may nonetheless recover under a quantum meruit theory.170
Enforcing oral contingency fee agreements, as at least one court has explained,
would undermine the purposes behind the rule and, interestingly, potentially
place those lawyers who do comply with the rules at a competitive
disadvantage.171 Despite these policy concerns and the traditional rule to the
contrary, recovery under quantum meruit remains the norm in these cases.
The justifications offered by courts for permitting recovery in quantum
meruit are typically those justifications one might expect. A court may express
the frequent concern over clients being unjustly enriched or receiving a windfall

168. Id. § 39 cmt. b(i).
169. Id.
170. See Calm C’s Inc. v. Shamburger (In re Complaint of Calm C’s Inc.), 179 F. App’x 911,
913 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying Florida and Louisiana law); United States v. 36.06 Acres of Land, 70
F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (D.N.M. 1999) (applying New Mexico law); Mullens v. Hansel–Henderson,
65 P.3d 992, 999 (Colo. 2002); Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 186 n.4 (Fla. 1995);
Young v. Southgate Dev. Corp., 399 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Mass. 1980); Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d at
242–43; Vaccaro v. Estate of Gorovoy, 696 A.2d 724, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see
also Gagne v. Vaccaro, 766 A.2d 416, 427 (Conn. 2001) (permitting recovery of a reasonable fee by
a lawyer against a successor lawyer where the original contingency fee agreement was not in
writing); Much Shelist Freed Denenberg & Ament, P.C. v. Lison, 696 N.E.2d 1196, 1202 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1998) (permitting an attorney to recover in quantum meruit despite the fact that the contingent
fee agreement was not in writing as required by the ethical rules and the client did not receive a
tangible benefit from the attorney’s representation). But see Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 809 F.2d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law and stating that the failure to put
a contingency fee in writing “does not make oral contingent fee arrangements unenforceable”
(citing Silverstein v. Hirst, 103 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa. 1954))); Weatherford v. Price, 340 S.C. 572,
581, 532 S.E.2d 310, 315 (Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that the state supreme court had not yet
“ruled that a fee agreement which violates Rule 1.5 . . . is unenforceable in all circumstances as
against public policy”). On a few occasions, courts have held that such agreements remain
enforceable; however, these decisions have generally involved attempts by strangers to the original
fee agreement to declare the agreements unenforceable, see, e.g., Cross v. Am. Country Ins. Co.,
875 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1989) (involving an effort by an insurance company, accused of
tortiously interfering with a lawyer’s contingency fee agreement with his client, to avoid liability by
asserting that the lawyer’s failure to abide by the ethical rule regarding oral contingency fees
rendered the agreement unenforceable), overruled by Kaplan v. Pavalon & Gifford, 12 F.3d 87, 90–
91 (7th Cir. 1993); Griggs v. Webber (In re Webber), 350 B.R. 344, 381 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006)
(stating that “an oral contingency fee agreement is voidable if a person with standing challenges the
contract” and “[t]he only person who has standing to challenge the oral agreement is the client”
(citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.065(b) (Vernon 2005))), or have been limited to their facts,
see, e.g., Lowrey v. Will of Smith, 543 So. 2d 1155, 1163 (Miss. 1989) (permitting attorney to
recover under the agreement “under the unusual facts of [the] case”).
171. Chandris, 668 So. 2d at 186.
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by receiving the lawyer’s services without paying for them.172 A court may
express the justification offered by the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers—denying any recovery would frustrate the expectations of
the parties that the lawyer would receive some compensation—sometimes by
relying on the Restatement as authority.173 Some courts view the writing
requirement of Model Rule 1.5(c) as merely “technical” in nature.174 Therefore,
they are reluctant to deny an attorney any recovery based on “minor technical
deficiencies” with respect to a fee agreement.175 Finally, at least one court has
suggested that the loss of the ability to recover under the contract (and thereby
not recover as much as the lawyer might have otherwise recovered), coupled
with a threat of discipline, should be an adequate deterrent to breaking the ethical
rule.176
In some instances, the willingness of courts to permit lawyers to recover the
fair value of their services is understandable. Although the rule that contingent
fees must be in writing and signed by the client serves an important purpose, the
rule feels less weighty than the rules prohibiting unreasonable fees or contingent
fees in divorce cases.177 Therefore, while it might be a stretch to refer to the rule
as merely “technical” in nature, it might be easier to conclude that the forfeiture
that would result to the attorney by denying any recovery would be
disproportionate to the public policy involved, particularly where there is no
suggestion of bad faith on the part of the attorney.178 Moreover, where the client
is sophisticated, represented by counsel, or both, the policies of preventing fraud
or misunderstandings about fees are unlikely to be implicated. However, courts
have sometimes permitted recovery in quantum meruit even when the policies
underlying the rule are implicated, such as when the client is unsophisticated or
particularly susceptible to overreaching or when there is a dispute as to the
percentage to which the lawyer and client agreed.179

172. Mullens, 65 P.3d at 999.
173. Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d at 243 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. b(i) (2000)); Vaccaro, 696 A.2d at 727 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. b(i) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
174. See Jacobsen v. Oliver, 555 F. Supp. 2d 72, 89 n.18 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Thomas, 764
So. 2d 943, 944 (La. 2000).
175. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 5.9, at 358 (noting that courts often permit recovery
in the case of violations of technical rules or regulations).
176. Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d at 243–44.
177. See supra Parts IV.A.1, IV.A.2.
178. See Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d at 243.
179. See Calm C’s Inc. v. Shamburger (In re Complaint of Calm C’s Inc.), 179 F. App’x 911,
913 (5th Cir. 2006) (permitting recovery in personal injury case); United States v. 36.06 Acres of
Land, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 n.1 (D.N.M. 1999) (permitting recovery where the law firm and its
client disagreed as to the percentage that the law firm would receive); Mullens v. Hansel–
Henderson, 65 P.3d 992, 999 (Colo. 2002) (permitting recovery where the attorney was hired to
obtain workers compensation benefits); Lowrey v. Will of Smith, 543 So. 2d 1155, 1156–57 (Miss.
1989) (enforcing an oral contingency fee where the lawyer represented an elderly client whose
husband had just died).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1561686

312

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61: 287

B. Other Fee Agreements that Offend Public Policy
In addition to the ethical rules that explicitly limit a lawyer’s ability to enter
into certain fee agreements with clients, there are other indirect limitations that
have developed over time. Although no ethical rule may speak directly to a
lawyer’s ability to include a particular term in a fee agreement, the policies that
naturally flow from the ethical rules governing lawyers and that are enshrined
within the broader law governing lawyers may nonetheless so limit a lawyer.
Two examples are fee agreements that purport to limit a client’s ability to settle a
matter without the lawyer’s consent and that provide for nonrefundable
retainers.180
1. Limitations on a Client’s Ability to Settle
One of the fundamental principles of the lawyer–client relationship is that
the client retains the absolute right to decide whether to settle a matter. This
principle had been enshrined in legal decisions long before the ABA
promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.181 It now finds its
clearest expression in Model Rule 1.2(a), which explicitly provides that “[a]
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”182 A
comment to the rule emphasizes that the client has “the ultimate authority to
determine the purposes to be served by legal representation,” including the
decision whether to settle.183 As a result, it is well-established that any provision
in a fee agreement that attempts to inhibit the client’s ability to exercise this right
is unenforceable.184
Despite this well-established rule, a lawyer who includes a provision
limiting the client’s ability to settle a matter without the lawyer’s prior approval

180. Other examples include situations in which a lawyer includes a provision in a fee
agreement that requires the client to pay the lawyer all legal fees and costs prior to discharging the
lawyer, see Jacobsen v. Oliver, 555 F. Supp. 2d 72, 79 (D.D.C. 2008), in which a lawyer engages in
unethical solicitation of a client, thereby calling into question the lawyer’s right to compensation
from that client, see Spence, Payne, Masington & Grossman, P.A. v. Philip M. Gerson, P.A., 483
So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), and in which a lawyer enters into a fee agreement with a
client whom the lawyer may be prohibited from representing due to a conflict of interest, see Lustig
v. Horn, 732 N.E.2d 613, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
181. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis’s Adm’x, 15 Ohio 715, 716 (1846) (“A contract with an
attorney to prosecute a suit containing a stipulation, that the party should not have the privilege to
settle or discontinue it, without the assent of the attorney, would be so much against good policy,
that the Court would not enforce it.”).
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009).
183. Id. cmt. 1.
184. See, e.g., Mattioni, Mattioni & Mattioni, Ltd. v. Ecological Shipping Corp., 530 F. Supp.
910, 917 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“[T]he attorney-consent clause contravened public policy . . . .”); Potter
v. Ajax Min. Co., 61 P. 999, 1003 (Utah 1900) (holding that the provision which required consent
of both parties to settle is unenforceable); see also Amy Owen, Commentary, May a Lawyer Agree
with the Client that the Laywer Must Approve All Settlements?, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 311, 311–12
(1992) (discussing whether a contractual right of attorney to veto a settlement is unenforceable).
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or who otherwise attempts to inhibit the client in the exercise of this right can
usually rest assured that she will receive at least some compensation for the
services provided to the client. In the overwhelming majority of cases, courts
permit lawyers who are parties to such agreements to recover, either under the
contract or in quantum meruit.185 Courts reach these results in several ways.
First, some courts have held that a provision limiting the client’s ability to
settle may be severed from the rest of the agreement, thus rendering the rest of
the agreement enforceable.186 According to the general contract rule, if a court
determines that a contractual term is unenforceable on public policy grounds, it
may nonetheless enforce the remainder of the agreement if performance of the
offending term is not an essential part of the contract.187 In other words, if the
unenforceable section of the contract was not so central to the agreement that the
parties would not have agreed absent that provision, the section may be severed
and the remainder of contract enforced.188
Some courts have held that, in fee agreements, restrictions on a client’s right
to settle are not an essential part of the agreement and may therefore be
severed—at least where the lawyer does not attempt to enforce the term or where
the possibility of settlement is never discussed.189 For example, one federal
district court concluded that because there was never any discussion of settling a
client’s underlying case, the fact that the firm had included a clause in the fee
agreement prohibiting the client from settling without the firm’s permission did
not render the entire fee agreement unenforceable.190 In the court’s view, the
inclusion of the offending clause rendered the fee agreement contrary to public
policy “only in the most academic sense.”191 In short, the mere presence of a
term that violates an ethical rule does not render the contract void as against

185. This is true of older decisions, see e.g., Davis v Webber, 49 S.W. 822, 825 (Ark. 1899)
(holding that an attorney may recover under quantum meruit even though the contract was void), as
well as more modern decisions, see Jacobsen, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 80; Mattioni, 530 F. Supp. at 917;
Jones v. Feiger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27, 36 (Colo. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds,
926 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1996); Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Homeowners’
Ass’n, 789 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
186. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 80 (holding that a right-to-settle provision may be
severed from the contract); Calvert v. Stoner, 199 P.2d 297, 300–01 (Cal. 1948) (holding that the
compensation provisions of an agreement are not affected and citing cases that do the same).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1) (1981).
188. Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Elec. Coop., Inc., 792 P.2d 50, 60 (Okla. 1990) (citing
Zerbetz v. Alaska Energy Ctr., 708 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Alaska 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 184).
189. See Sweeney v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr., 917 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[E]ven
if portions of the fee agreement violate the canons of ethics the agreement is still enforceable if the
objectionable provisions are not at issue and can be severed from the rest of the agreement.” (citing
Rasmussen v. Nodvin, 329 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985))); Jacobsen, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 80
(concluding that a right-to-settle clause that was never invoked was not an essential part of the
bargain and therefore was severable).
190. Jacobsen, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
191. Id.
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public policy.192 Even if the law firm had sought to enforce the clause, the court
explained, the rest of the fee agreement would have still been enforceable
because the offending no-settlement provision could have been severed.193
According to the court, the fact that settlement never became an issue indicated
that the no-settlement clause was not an essential part of the bargain.194 As such,
the provision could be severed and the rest of the agreement enforced.195
Other courts have severed clauses limiting the right of clients to accept a
settlement offer even when settlement was discussed and became a possibility.196
According to one court, the test for severability is whether “the good and bad are
so interwoven that they cannot be separated without altering or destroying the
general meaning and purpose of the contract.”197 If that is the case, “the good
must go with the bad, and the whole contract be set aside.”198 Reasoning that the
general purpose of a fee agreement is to provide for the exchange of legal
services for payment, these courts have concluded that a restriction on a client’s
ability to settle is not material to this exchange.199
Even if an offending term is not an essential part of an agreement, in order to
take advantage of the severability rule, the party seeking enforcement of the rest
of the agreement must not have engaged in “serious misconduct.”200 Whether
misconduct is sufficiently “serious” to justify the refusal to enforce the entire
agreement depends, in part, on the gravity of the public policy involved.201
Similarly, an individual term within an unenforceable provision may only be
enforced if, according to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “the party who
seeks to enforce the term obtained it in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing.”202
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, courts should refuse to
sever an offending term where a party’s misconduct “is so serious that a refusal
to enforce the entire agreement is a proper sanction to discourage such
conduct.”203 In making this determination and the determination of whether the
party obtained a term in bad faith and not in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing, courts have looked to a variety of factors. The
relationship between the parties is one such factor.204 According to the

192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Calvert v. Stoner, 199 P.2d 297, 300–01 (Cal. 1948) (citing cases with similar
holdings).
197. Newport Rolling Mill Co. v. Hall, 144 S.W. 760, 763 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912).
198. Id. at 763.
199. Id.
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1) (1981).
201. Id. § 183 cmt. b.
202. Id. § 184(2).
203. Id. § 183 cmt. b.
204. See Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 520 N.E.2d 770, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (explaining
that a court should consider the relative positions of the parties when deciding whether the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1561686

2009]

ATTORNEY–CLIENT FEE AGREEMENTS

315

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the fact that one party “has taken advantage
of his dominant bargaining power to extract from the other party a promise that
is clearly so broad as to offend public policy” cuts against enforcement, as does
the fact that the dominant party included the term in a standard form.205 The fact
that the party seeking enforcement purposefully overreached also cuts against
enforcement.206 In addition, the court must judge the conduct of the party
seeking enforcement in light of the applicable standards of that party’s business
or profession, including any ethical norms that may apply.207
Applying those factors to the situation in which a lawyer includes or
attempts to enforce a fee agreement limiting a client’s right to settle would
logically seem to result in a finding in most cases that the offending provision is
not severable. As a starting point, the rule reflects a fundamental policy value in
the law governing lawyers. Regarding the nature of the relationship between the
parties, the lawyer–client relationship is, of course, fiduciary in nature; it is a
relationship built on confidence and trust.208 Aside from this fact, one of the
concerns underlying the ethical rules regarding fee agreements is that clients are
often in a weaker bargaining position when it comes to negotiating fee
agreements with lawyers.209 In addition, a lawyer who has placed a limitation on
a client’s ability to settle has almost certainly purposefully overreached. The rule
prohibiting these kinds of no-settlement provisions is so clear and wellestablished that no practicing lawyer can claim in good faith to be unaware of it.
Accordingly, a lawyer’s inclusion of a provision limiting a client’s right to
settle almost certainly represents a deliberate attempt by the lawyer—a person
who occupies a special position of trust—to deny the client a fundamental right
associated with the lawyer–client relationship. Thus, it is difficult to see how one
could classify this behavior as anything other than serious misconduct in most
cases. Yet, a significant number of courts have severed these types of provisions
from the rest of a fee agreement and enforced the remainder of the agreement.210
Other courts have concluded that these types of restrictions on a client’s
right to settle are not severable. At least one court has concluded that a provision

misconduct was serious); Technical Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262, 272 (N.H. 1991) (stating that
an employer who purposefully overreaches by “creating multiple covenants sharing the same
subject matter but of slightly varying scope, is guilty of ‘serious misconduct’” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1))).
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 cmt. b.
206. See Technical Aid Corp., 591 A.2d at 272 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 184(1)).
207. See Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(explaining that the concept of good faith must be judged by reference to the standards applicable to
the business of the parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d (stating that
reasonable standards of fair dealing are reflected in prevailing business ethics).
208. Richmond, supra note 117, at 78.
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (2000)
(explaining the special rules regarding attorney–client fee agreements by reference to the fact that
“[m]any clients do not bargain effectively because of their need and inexperience”).
210. See supra notes 186–188 and accompanying text.
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limiting a client’s right to settle is not severable where it is directly linked to
another contractual provision involving the calculation of fee, such as a
provision granting the firm the right to withdraw from representation and receive
a potentially higher compensation if the client turns down a reasonable
settlement offer.211 In other instances, courts have concluded that a provision
limiting a client’s right to settle taints the entire agreement, regardless of whether
it is specifically linked to another clause related to fees.212 In keeping with the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ view that a provision is not severable where
the party seeking enforcement of the rest of the contract engaged in serious
misconduct, a few courts have taken into consideration the fact that it has a
lawyer who tried to impose the term on a client, rather than a party negotiating at
arm’s length with a relative stranger as in a standard commercial transaction.213
Thus, for example, one court has suggested that the fiduciary nature of the
relationship between a lawyer and a client is a factor to consider in deciding
whether this type of restriction on settlement is severable from the rest of the fee
agreement.214
Even where courts have refused to sever the offending provision from the
remainder of the agreement and have declared the entire agreement to be void as
against public policy, they have routinely permitted lawyers to recover in
quantum meruit.215 Occasionally, courts qualify their decisions with the
observation that recovery is appropriate at least where there has been no showing
of fraud, grossly unprofessional conduct, or other similar conduct.216 But the

211. See Jones v. Feiger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. App. 1994), rev’d on
other grounds, 926 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1996).
212. See Mattioni, Mattioni & Mattioni, Ltd. v. Ecological Shipping Corp., 530 F. Supp. 910,
913–14, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Cummings v. Patterson, 442 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).
213. See, e.g., Cummings, 442 S.W.2d at 643 (concluding that it would be inappropriate to
sever the offending clause where lawyers repeatedly tried to enforce the clause against the client,
causing the client to incur costs to defend).
214. See Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Homeowners’ Ass’n, 789 P.2d 52,
56 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
215. See, e.g., Mattioni, 530 F. Supp. at 914 (voiding provision does not prevent attorney from
collecting in quantum meruit); Davis v Webber, 49 S.W. 822, 825–26 (Ark. 1899) (granting
recovery in quantum meruit even though contract was against public policy); Jones, 903 P.2d at 35–
36 (permitting recovery in quantum meruit when provisions of agreement were unenforceable);
Cummings, 442 S.W.2d at 643 (concluding that recovery in quantum meruit was proper even
though the provision against settlement and other provisions were not severable); Parents Against
Drunk Drivers, 789 P.2d at 57 (concluding that recovery in quantum meruit is appropriate in such
cases). Older decisions suggest that there was, at one point, something of a split as to whether
quantum meruit was appropriate under these circumstances. See Downey v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 232 P.
531, 537 (Mont. 1924) (citing cases as recognition of a split). More modern cases almost uniformly
permit recovery.
216. See Mattioni, 530 F. Supp. at 914 (permitting recovery in quantum meruit because there
was “nothing in the record to show that plaintiff was proceeding in bad faith in attempting to
undercut [the client’s] opportunity to settle [the] litigation”); Calvert v. Stoner, 199 P.2d 297, 301
(Cal. 1948) (stating that quantum meruit recovery is appropriate “in the absence of an affirmative
showing of fraud or bad faith on the part of the defendant in his dealings with his client”); Jones,
903 P.2d at 35 (“[A]t least when an attorney has not engaged in fraudulent or grossly unprofessional
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inclusion or attempted enforcement of a provision that is clearly in violation of
the ethical rules governing attorneys and that has been held to be unenforceable
on policy grounds for over a century apparently does not qualify in the minds of
most courts. Thus, for example, in permitting quantum meruit recovery, one
court referred to a lawyer’s inclusion of a clause limiting the client’s ability to
settle as the “innocent inclusion of this obnoxious provision.”217 The fact that the
lawyer made repeated attempts to prevent the client from accepting a settlement,
resulting in the client having to hire a new attorney to defend himself from the
attorney’s legal action to enforce the provision, did not, in the court’s view,
amount to the type of unprofessional conduct necessary to preclude quantum
meruit recovery or to reduce the amount of that recovery.218
2. Nonrefundable Retainers
Another situation in which a lawyer’s ability to set the terms of a fee
agreement may be limited is in the case of a nonrefundable retainer provision.
There is significant disagreement concerning whether a lawyer may ethically
include provisions making the payment of a retainer nonrefundable and whether
such provisions are enforceable.219 The issue is made more complicated by the
difficulty in even defining what is meant by the term “nonrefundable retainer.”
Courts and commentators have sometimes attempted to place retainers into
one of two categories: general and special. As some courts use the term, a
“general retainer” is a fee paid to ensure a lawyer’s availability during a
specified time period.220 General retainers are usually considered to be earned
when received and, in that sense, are nonrefundable.221 Because the fees paid are

conduct, the reasonable value of services may be recovered even if other provisions of the
representation agreement, including those providing for calculation of fees, are unenforceable.”).
217. Cummings, 442 S.W.2d at 643.
218. Id.
219. One of the first articles to discuss the issue was Lester Brickman & Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract
Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149 (1988). Since then, the subject has generated significant discussion,
both in legal scholarship and judicial opinions. See David C. Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling
the Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 65, 69–74 (1996)
(arguing that nonrefundable retainers may have strategic benefits in litigation for clients); Steven
Lubet, The Rush to Remedies: Some Conceptual Questions About Nonrefundable Retainers, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 271, 274 (citing Brickman & Cunningham, supra) (questioning whether all nonrefundable
retainer agreements should be considered unethical); Pamela S. Kunen, Note, No Leg To Stand On:
The General Retainer Exception to the Ban on Nonrefundable Retainers Must Fall, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 719, 721 (1996) (arguing in favor of a ban on all such agreements); cases cited infra notes
220–249 and accompanying text.
220. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 54
(Iowa 1998) (citing Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be
Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 647,
649 n.13 (1989)).
221. Id. at 57.
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often considered earned upon receipt, courts in many jurisdictions permit general
retainers.222
In contrast, special retainers are fees paid in advance for a specific legal
service.223 Occasionally in their fee agreements, lawyers will assert a right to
make these fees nonrefundable, regardless of whether the lawyer performs all of
the services contemplated by the agreement.224 Thus, the use of these kinds of
special nonrefundable retainers has generated much of the controversy. Of
course, it is not always so simple to categorize an agreement. There are hybrid
agreements in which a client pays both for attorney availability and specific
services.225 And sometimes lawyers will specifically include a liquidated
damages clause in a fee agreement, providing for payment of a designated sum
by the client in the event the client terminates the representation early.226
Generally, courts deem these types of provisions void as against public policy
and unenforceable.227 That said, there are still a respectable number of judicial
decisions and ethics opinions that permit the use of such provisions,228 at least in
some circumstances.229
The issues concerning the enforceability of nonrefundable retainers are
complex and warrant their own separate discussion. However, the fact that these
retainers are permitted in some jurisdictions raises at least of some of the issues
addressed in this Article. Critics challenge the use of special nonrefundable

222. See id.; Perillo, supra note 1, at 450.
223. Apland, 577 N.W.2d at 55 (citing Brickman, supra note 220, at 649).
224. See id. at 57.
225. Kunen, supra note 219, at 724 (citing Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993)).
226. See Keene v. Reggie, 701 So. 2d 720, 723 (La. Ct. App. 1997); McQueen, Rains &
Tresch, LLP v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 195 P.3d 35, 37 n.3 (Okla. 2008). Given the variety of retainers,
relying solely on a definitional approach to determine whether a retainer agreement is permissible
may prove problematic. See Alexander K. McKinnon, Note, Analytical Approaches to the
Nonrefundable Retainer, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 590–93 (1996) (noting the disadvantages of
this approach).
227. See, e.g., AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. 1994) (holding that a
provision was “unenforceable as a liquidated damages clause”); Apland, 577 N.W.2d at 57 (holding
that fees were refundable “notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”); In re Cooperman, 633
N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1994) (holding special nonrefundable retainer unenforceable); see also In
re Sather, 3 P.3d 403, 413 (Colo. 2000) (holding that attorneys may not enter into nonrefundable fee
agreements or otherwise communicate to clients that fees paid are nonrefundable).
228. See Bunker v. Meshbesher, 147 F.3d 691, 695 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Minnesota
permits reasonable nonrefundable attorney–client fee agreements); Grievance Adm’r, Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Cooper, 757 N.W.2d 867, 867 (Mich. 2008) (concluding that nonrefundable
retainer agreement did not violate ethical rules regarding reasonable fees and retention of client
property); McKinnon, supra note 226, at 603–10 (providing survey of ABA and state ethics
opinions dealing with nonrefundable retainers and demonstrating that some opinions permit the use
of nonrefundable retainers).
229. See McQueen, 195 P.3d at 45 (holding that, under “the unique facts presented,”
liquidated damages clause in a fixed-term retainer agreement was enforceable); see also McKinnon,
supra note 226, at 583, 603–10 (describing the states as being “split” on the issue and noting that
several states permit the use of nonrefundable retainers with only limited qualifiers).
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retainers on a number of grounds. At the most basic level, critics argue that the
enforcement of nonrefundable retainer provisions is inconsistent with traditional
contract law.230 Critics argue that special nonrefundable retainers are not valid as
a form of liquidated damages because they excuse a lawyer’s failure to mitigate
damages and they are simply an attempt to secure payment of a lawyer’s fee
rather than an attempt to compensate a lawyer in the event of client breach.231
Instead, “the typical nonrefundable retainer is an in terrorem device
discouraging client termination rather than a good faith estimate of the net losses
the lawyer will sustain upon client breach.”232
Critics also attack nonrefundable retainers on the grounds that they conflict
with the policies outlined in legal ethics rules. The use of special nonrefundable
retainer provisions implicates several important public policies underlying the
ethical rules governing attorneys.233 Perhaps the most obvious is the policy of
protecting a client’s absolute right to discharge her lawyer.234 The rationale
underlying the rule in favor of a client’s right to discharge an attorney is that the
attorney–client relationship is based on trust.235 Once that trust is lost, the
relationship ceases to function effectively.236 Therefore, given the importance of
the attorney–client relationship, a client must retain the ability to discharge an
attorney subject only to the requirement that the lawyer is entitled to payment for
his services.237
Simply stated, a nonrefundable retainer provision serves as a significant
disincentive to a client’s exercise of the right to discharge her lawyer.238 In 1994,
the New York Court of Appeals concluded that in the clash between the
competing policies of freedom of contract and a client’s right to discharge a
lawyer, the policy in favor of a client’s right to discharge should prevail.239
Consequently, the court held that special nonrefundable retainers are

230. Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 219, at 176.
231. Id. at 178.
232. Id. at 178–79.
233. McKinnon, supra note 226, at 586 (stating that the use of nonrefundable retainers
implicates the ethical rules regarding the reasonableness of fees, the client’s right to discharge her
attorney, and the prohibition against attorneys acquiring a proprietary interest in a cause of action);
see also Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Ward (In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ward), 691
N.W.2d 689, 694–95 (Wis. 2005) (concluding that a lawyer who refused to return an unearned
portion of a retainer violated the ethical rule prohibiting the charging of an unreasonable fee).
234. Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to
Critics of the Absolute Ban, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 12–13 (1995) (describing the client’s absolute
right to discharge an attorney as “the cornerstone upon which the absolute ban on nonrefundable
retainers rests”).
235. Id. at 14.
236. Id.
237. See In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994).
238. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 451–52 (“[I]f the client wishes to withdraw from the retainer,
recovery by the client of the unearned portion of the fee would be consistent with the law’s
willingness to allow clients the freedom to change representation.”).
239. See In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1072.
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unenforceable on policy grounds.240 Since then, a number of courts have
agreed.241
Despite the courts’ general disfavor of special nonrefundable retainers, there
are several reasons to be cautious about using the courts’ treatment of such
retainers as an example of the tougher approach courts take with respect to
attorney fee agreements. First, while courts have expressed concern over special
nonrefundable retainers, they have, overall, been accepting of general
retainers.242 However, in practice, lawyers often use hybrid retainers, thus
making it difficult to draw any meaningful distinction between the two.243 More
importantly, many of the arguments against enforcing special nonrefundable
retainers would seem to apply with similar or equal force to general retainers.
One of the arguments against special nonrefundable retainers is that a lawyer
who has been fired by her client prior to the completion of all of the services
contemplated by the fee agreement has not earned all of her fees. Yet, with a
general retainer, a lawyer’s fees are based on the lawyer’s availability during a
given period. If the client fires the lawyer prior to the end of that period, the
lawyer has not been “available” for the entire period. Consequently, the lawyer’s
entire fee has not been earned.244 Moreover, general retainers implicate nearly all
of the same policy concerns regarding client choice as special nonrefundable
retainers.245 This has led several commentators to assert that there is no
principled distinction between general and special retainers that justifies the
courts’ different treatment.246 Despite this argument, courts have not reexamined
the long-standing belief that general retainers are consistent with the ethical rules
and hence enforceable.
Second, as mentioned above, a substantial minority of jurisdictions continue
to permit the use of special nonrefundable retainers.247 In some of these
decisions, courts have failed to engage in any type of explicit balancing of
competing interests and have instead allowed the use of special nonrefundable
retainers with little to no comment.248 Finally, even where a court refuses to

240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 901 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 2009)
(finding that the special nonrefundable retainer in an attorney–client contract violated the ethical
rule prohibiting unreasonable fees).
242. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
243. John M.A. DiPippa, Lawyers, Clients, and Money, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 95, 109
(1995) (noting the argument that “retainers are almost never exclusively either general or special”
but instead “are a mixture of payment for availability and payment for specified services”).
244. See Lubet, supra note 219, at 287; Kunen, supra note 219, at 735; McKinnon, supra note
226, at 591.
245. See Lubet, supra note 219, at 288; Kunen, supra note 219, at 734.
246. Lubet, supra note 219, at 287; Kunen, supra note 219, at 721; see also McKinnon, supra
note 226, at 591 (stating that “under certain factual scenarios, the definitions fail”).
247. See supra notes 228–229 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Bunker v. Meshbesher, 147 F.3d 691, 695 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
Minnesota law permits reasonable “non-refundable fixed or flat fee retainer agreements”);
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enforce a nonrefundable retainer provision on policy grounds, a lawyer can
usually rest at least a little easier knowing that quantum meruit recovery is still
the norm in these cases.249
V. WHY THINGS ARE THE WAY THEY ARE AND THE WAY THEY SHOULD BE
To recap, in a few situations, courts have been hesitant to declare that a fee
agreement that fails to comply with an ethical rule governing the legal profession
is unenforceable on policy grounds despite the strong public policy articulated
by the rule. Where a court does decide that a fee agreement is unenforceable due
to an ethics violation, a lawyer will still normally be able to recover in quantum
meruit. This approach, although reflected in the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, is in contrast with the traditional rules of contract law as
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and other authorities.250
Typically, courts offer little explanation for their decisions to permit lawyers to
recover in the face of fee agreements that violate ethical rules or that otherwise
offend public policy. Occasionally, there is some reference to the need to deter
unethical behavior with respect to fee agreements,251 but such references are the
exception rather than the norm. More often, a court will explain its decision by
saying that a client would be unjustly enriched if the client received the lawyer’s
services for free.252 But rarely is there much of an attempt to balance this concern
against the strength of the policy value underlying the ethical rule at issue.253
Assuming then, that courts treat lawyers more favorably than they do other
parties to contracts that offend public policy, the obvious question is why?254

Grievance Adm’r, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cooper, 757 N.W.2d 867, 867 (Mich. 2008)
(holding that retainer did not violate ethical rules).
249. See Wong v. Michael Kennedy, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 73, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing In re
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994)) (holding that a special nonrefundable retainer
agreement was per se violative of public policy but that the attorney could recover under quantum
meruit for the reasonable value of the services rendered); Jennings v. Backmeyer, 569 N.E.2d 689,
691 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that a nonrefundable fixed fee contract was illusory and that
the attorney was entitled only to the reasonable value of the services actually rendered); see also
McQueen, Rains & Tresch, LLP v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 195 P.3d 35, 44 & nn.21–23 (Okla. 2008)
(providing list of cases where courts refused to enforce nonrefundable retainers and, in some cases,
allowed recovery in quantum meruit).
250. See supra Parts II, III.
251. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 143, 172 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
254. I, of course, concede that courts sometimes enforce nonlawyer fee agreements that violate
a professional rule of ethics or consumer protection statute similar to those discussed in this Article.
See Gannon & Son, Inc. v. Emerson, 435 A.2d 449, 450 (Md. 1981) (enforcing an oral agreement
for home improvement construction work despite the fact that a statute provided that such
agreements must be in writing). Nor can I deny that courts sometimes adopt a more liberal approach
to the issue of recovery in quantum meruit than that outlined in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts in these kinds of cases. Indeed, some courts seem to take a particularly dim view of total
forfeiture in the event a provision runs afoul of some public policy. See Daynard v. Ness, Motley,
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Why do courts depart from basic rules of contract law in the case of lawyer fee
agreements? And if the approach of the majority of courts is misguided, what are
the alternatives?
A. Why the Special Rules for Attorney Fee Agreements?
It is entirely understandable and, indeed, appropriate for state supreme
courts to take a special interest in cases involving fee agreements that run afoul
of the disciplinary rules governing lawyers. After all, state supreme courts have
the authority to regulate the practice of law in their states.255 Courts have often
relied upon this fact as part of their justification for invalidating lawyer fee
agreements.256
Moreover, the special concerns associated with the lawyer–client fiduciary
relationship and the prevalence of disciplinary rules addressing that relationship
may, in some instances, justify a departure from traditional contract rules or a
different application of those rules. Professor Perillo was absolutely correct
when he noted that the law of lawyers’ contracts is different.257 It is different
because of the special concerns associated with the lawyer–client relationship
and because of the role that lawyers play as public citizens and in the
administration of justice.258 Attorney’s fees occupy a special place in the

Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 188 F. Supp. 2d 115, 125 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Massachusetts
courts rarely require complete forfeiture of the contract, sometimes allow recovery for the fair and
reasonable value of the services rendered, and sometimes permit recovery on the contract in its
entirety.”). That said, one need not look hard to find decisions in which courts refused to enforce fee
agreements between nonlawyers that violated professional rules of ethics or consumer protection
statutes similar to those discussed in this Article and also refused to permit quantum meruit
recovery. See Caulkins v. Petrillo, 513 A.2d 43, 47 (Conn. 1986) (holding that an oral home
improvement contract was unenforceable because it failed to comply with a statutory requirement
that such contracts be in writing); Osteen v. Morris, 481 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (refusing to permit a motor vehicle repair shop to recover on a quantum meruit basis where
the shop failed to provide a customer with a written estimate as required by statute); Maynes Real
Estate, Inc. v. McPherron, 353 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Iowa 1984) (holding an oral real estate listing
contract to be unenforceable due to its failure to comply with regulations and refusing to permit
quantum meruit recovery). Assuming that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts truly restates the
general approach to these kinds of cases, there can be no dispute that the courts have generally
adopted a different approach when it comes to lawyer fee agreements.
255. Long, supra note 93, at 1081–82 (citing WOLFRAM, supra note 97, § 2.2.2).
256. See, e.g., Chittenden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 So. 2d 1140, 1147–48 (La.
2001) (noting that the attorney–client relationship is subject to the authority of the court to regulate
the practice of law); Cohen v. Radio–Elecs. Officers Union, Dist. 3, 645 A.2d 1248, 1255, 1259
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (citing Taylor v. Bd. of Educ., 455 A.2d 552, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1983)) (invalidating a portion of an attorney–client contract based on the court’s
responsibility to regulate the practice of law).
257. Perillo, supra note 1, at 443–45.
258. See In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994) (“[A]ttorney-client fee
agreements are a matter of special concern to the courts and are enforceable and affected by lofty
principles different from those applicable to commonplace commercial contracts.”); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 6 (2009) (“As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement
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administration of justice. For example, the promise of attorney’s fees in civil
rights cases persuades attorneys to take cases they might not otherwise be
inclined to take.259 The ability of a lawyer to charge a contingent fee may make it
possible for an individual to obtain representation he might not otherwise be able
to obtain.260 There is also growing concern over the ability of people, not just of
lower income, but of the middle class, to afford quality legal representation.261
When lawyers charge excessive fees or otherwise frustrate important policy
goals through the use of a fee agreement, they limit access to justice and cause
the public to lose faith in the legal system. One court explained this concern as
follows:
The court is an instrument of society for the administration of
justice. Justice should be administered economically, efficiently, and
expeditiously. The attorney’s fee is, therefore, a very important factor in
the administration of justice, and if it is not determined with proper
relation to that fact it results in a species of social malpractice that
undermines the confidence of the public in the bench and bar. It does
more than that; it brings the court into disrepute and destroys its power
to perform adequately the function of its creation.262
Therefore, it should hardly be surprising to see special contract rules develop for
attorneys.263
Nor should it be surprising to find that judges, for personal reasons, are
inclined to take a special interest in cases involving fee agreements that arguably
offend public policy. Given their backgrounds as lawyers, judges are likely to
view with interest disputes involving lawyers. Fee disputes would seem to be
particularly salient issues for judges. As former lawyers, judges know something
about the work of lawyers and its value that they do not necessarily know about
other professions and occupations. Many judges were not only once lawyers but
successful lawyers.264 They remember the long hours and the compensation that
came with it. Thus, many judges are likely to view fee disputes as special in a

of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession.”).
259. See James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment
Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819, 1829–30 (2008) (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597
(2006)).
260. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
261. See George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal
Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 789 (2001).
262. Baruch v. Giblin, 164 So. 831, 833 (Fla. 1935).
263. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 445 (suggesting that different treatment of lawyer contracts is
justified).
264. Barton, supra note 13, at 460.
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way that merits special attention and that can benefit from the special insight a
judge may bring to these cases.265
B. Why the Preferential Treatment for Attorney Fee Agreements?
Special interest on the part of a judge is certainly understandable in these
cases. But what accounts for the generally lawyer-friendly approach? Professor
Ben Barton has suggested one possibility.
Barton hypothesizes that when confronted with an issue that “will
significantly affect the interests of the legal profession,” courts will decide the
issue “in the way that offers the best result for the legal profession.”266 In other
words, “if there is a clear advantage or disadvantage to the legal profession in
any given question of law, . . . judges will choose the route (within the bounds of
precedent and seemliness) that benefits the profession as a whole.”267 Barton
offers several examples to prove his hypothesis, including the special rules
prohibiting the use of noncompete agreements among attorneys and the lawyerfriendly rules governing legal malpractice claims.268 Situations like those
discussed in this Article would seem to fit neatly into Barton’s list of examples.
Barton also offers several explanations as to why, when presented with the
choice, judges will favor the interests of the legal profession.269 Although some
of the reasons offered by Barton involve subconscious factors, others relate quite
directly to judges’ self-interests and natural sympathies.270 First, as former
lawyers, judges may be more sympathetic to the practical realities of the practice
of law than they are to the realities of other professions.271 Judges are highly
dependent upon the goodwill of practicing lawyers for their initial appointments,
their tenure in office, and their salaries.272 Moreover, judges are, of course, also
lawyers and continue to think of themselves as such and socialize with other

265. See id. (“On a subconscious level, when judges face a question that will impact the legal
profession[,] judges naturally react in terms of how it will affect ‘us’ more than ‘them.’”); Ted
Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona’s Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial
Independence Through the Power to Regulate the Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 455
(2006) (arguing that judges “have special insight into the value of the attorney–client privilege in
fostering candid lawyer–client relations because” the judiciary bears “primary responsibility for
regulating law practice”); Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution:
How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 87, 123 (2003) (explaining that judicial behavior is shaped by an “egocentric bias,”
which causes them “to evaluate unrealistically how special” some cases are in comparison to
others).
266. Barton, supra note 13, at 454.
267. Id. at 454–55.
268. Id. at 487–503.
269. Id. at 458–60.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 460 (citing Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:
Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1197–98 (2003)).
272. Id. at 458 (citing Barton, supra note 271, at 1198–200).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1561686

2009]

ATTORNEY–CLIENT FEE AGREEMENTS

325

lawyers.273 Naturally then, a judge could be expected to “think hard about the
reactions of his or her peer group and friends to a decision that will have a
substantial effect on them.”274
These considerations would seem to be at play in the fee dispute situations
described in this Article. A legal question concerning the enforceability of a fee
agreement is the ultimate “pocketbook issue” for a lawyer. Adopting and
enforcing a presumption against compensation for services rendered would tend
to earn a judge the enmity of the bar. Disputes over the enforceability of fee
agreements bring to bear substantial pressure—political, financial, and social—
on judges.275 Indeed, one judge seemed keenly aware of the dilemma judges face
in these cases when he observed that “[f]ee disputes require careful and
principled consideration because of the public’s concern that judges might
sympathize with their colleagues at the bar when it comes to fees and because of
the legal community’s concern that judges are unfamiliar with the economic
realities of modern law practice.”276
Consistent with Barton’s hypothesis, it makes sense that judges would also
tend to focus more on compensation issues than the issue of whether a fee
agreement is enforceable. Given long-standing precedent on the subject of
unethical fee agreements and the courts’ special role in policing these
agreements, judges are limited in their ability to enforce fee agreements that fail
to comply with the ethical rules governing lawyers. However, questions
regarding recovery in quantum meruit or for unjust enrichment are rooted in
equity and are generally left to a judge’s discretion.277
Subconscious factors might also be at work.278 In light of their prior life
experiences, one should not be surprised to see judges focus primarily on the
question of appropriate compensation rather than the question of enforceability.
As former lawyers, judges may view themselves as having special insight into
the relative worth of a lawyer’s services in a given case and possessing a more
complete frame of reference in terms of understanding the realities of the billable
hour or sifting through the conflicting testimony of experts as to the dollar value
of a lawyer’s services. Indeed, some courts have expressly recognized that
judges are not limited to the evidence presented as to the value of a lawyer’s

273. Id. at 458–59.
274. Id. at 459.
275. See id. at 457–59.
276. Alexander v. Inman, No. 01A01-9605-CH-00215, 1996 WL 709369, at *5 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 11, 1996) (Koch, J., dissenting), rev’d, 974 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1998).
277. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008) (“[E]quity rulings generally
lie within the discretion of the trial court . . . .”); Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v.
Lansberry, 629 N.E.2d 431, 437 (Ohio 1994) (“Because the factors to be considered [for
determining the reasonableness of attorney fees] are based on the equities of the situation, those
factors, as well as the ultimate amount of quantum meruit recovery by a discharged attorney, are
matters to be resolved by the trial court within the exercise of its discretion.”).
278. See Barton, supra note 13, at 459–60 (discussing subconscious reasons why judges favor
the interests of the legal profession).
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services and may rely on their prior professional experience in determining the
amount of quantum meruit recovery.279 This might include experiences from
their prior lives as lawyers concerning difficult clients and the problems
sometimes associated with receiving compensation for their legal services.280 As
a result, the relevant question—or at least the more interesting one—for many
judges is not the amorphous question of whether quantum meruit recovery is
appropriate, but the more tangible question—and the question they likely believe
their prior experience has prepared them to answer—of how much a lawyer
should be allowed to recover in quantum meruit.
Another possible and less critical explanation for the reluctance of judges to
prohibit completely a lawyer from recovering the value of her services in the
face of an ethically questionable fee agreement is that the majority of courts have
simply arrived at the proper resolution of the competing interests. Courts are
understandably concerned about the potentially harsh consequences of declaring
a fee agreement unenforceable on policy grounds. Perhaps then, courts, in the
legitimate exercise of the wide discretion afforded to them,281 have concluded
that the case of an attorney–fee agreement that fails to comply with an applicable
ethical rule is special enough to warrant departure from traditional contract rules.
Because courts usually treat the ethics rules as substantive law for purposes
of fee agreements,282 lawyers face constraints on their ability to enter into fee
agreements that other nonprofessionals do not face.283 Even when no specific
ethical rule governs, courts have imposed seemingly tougher standards on
lawyers than other individuals due to the fiduciary nature of the lawyer–client
relationship, concerns over “the ability of the lawyer to dominate the client,” and
the need to promote the administration of justice.284 Thus, lawyers may face
more land mines in the enforceability of their fee agreements than other
professionals.
In some instances, a blanket rule prohibiting recovery for employing certain
kinds of fee agreements might unfairly and unnecessarily preclude lawyers and
clients from entering into mutually beneficial arrangements. For example, take
the case of special nonrefundable retainers. The question of whether special

279. See, e.g., Will v. Nw. Univ., 881 N.E.2d 481, 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“[T]he trial court
‘is not limited to the evidence presented in arriving at a reasonable fee but may also use the
knowledge it has acquired in the discharge of professional duties to value legal services rendered.’”
(quoting Johns v. Klecan, 556 N.E.2d 689, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990))).
280. See Mulhern v. Roach, 494 N.E.2d 1327, 1335 & n.14 (Mass. 1986) (taking into account,
when determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee, that the client was “difficult,” having
fired several previous attorneys, and that another attorney had difficulty collecting from the client).
281. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
283. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 445 (“[C]ontractual freedom is muted in the lawyer-client
and the lawyer-lawyer contexts.”).
284. Id. at 490 (explaining that the presumption of undue influence that exists in contracts
between lawyers and clients exists for these reasons, in addition to “the assumption by the client
that the lawyer has no interest that conflicts with the client’s own interests”).
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nonrefundable retainers should be enforceable involves a choice between
conflicting public policies, including the policy in favor of freedom of contract285
and the policy in favor of a client’s right to discharge an attorney.286 One could
argue, as has Professor Steven Lubet, that the policy in favor of client choice
need not always prevail in this conflict.287 For example, Lubet suggests the
possibility that sophisticated clients might, with full understanding of the
possible ramifications, enter into such agreements because they believe them to
be beneficial.288 In these kinds of cases, a blanket rule against the use of
nonrefundable retainers might actually run counter to the policy in favor of client
autonomy.289
In other instances, the potential land mines imposed by the ethical rules
might conceivably trip up even the best-intentioned lawyer.290 In such cases,
denying the lawyer the ability to recover for the reasonable value of the services
provided truly might amount to a forfeiture that is disproportionate to the policy
goals at stake. Accordingly, the more lawyer-friendly approach that permits
lawyers to recover for the reasonable value of their services in the face of a fee
agreement that conflicts with an ethical rule may simply be a reflection of the
reality that the practice of law is, now more than ever, also a business,291 and it is
a business that is highly regulated when it comes to compensation agreements.
In deciding whether to permit recovery of a lawyer’s fees, a court must take
these realities into account while weighing the competing interests. In light of
the fact that a lawyer who violates an ethical rule regarding fee agreements may
also face professional discipline, the decision of the majority of courts to refuse
to enforce the agreement but permit quantum meruit recovery may, in the minds
of most judges, be an appropriate resolution of the competing interests. Because
the public policy underlying the ethical rule can still be vindicated through the
disciplinary process and by refusing to enforce the fee agreement, complete
forfeiture of the fee would be disproportionate to the policy at stake. This is
especially true, the argument goes, because the threat of professional discipline
and nonenforcement of the fee agreement should be enough to deter most

285. See id. at 445.
286. See id. at 450.
287. See Lubet, supra note 219, at 274 (challenging the proposition that all nonrefundable
retainer agreements are per se unethical).
288. Id. at 276; see also McQueen, Rains & Tresch, LLP v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 195 P.3d 35,
47 (Okla. 2008) (“It would be counterproductive, in an era of increasing concerns over the cost of
legal services, to preclude a client from bargaining for a reduction in fees in exchange for a
reasonable limitation on the right of discharge.” (citing McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758
F.2d 97, 101–02 (3d Cir. 1985))).
289. See Lubet, supra note 219, at 275–76.
290. See, e.g., Young v. Southgate Dev. Corp., 399 N.E.2d 27, 28 (Mass. 1980) (involving a
lawyer who tried but was unable to have his client sign a contingency fee agreement and thus was
denied recovery of the contingent fee amount).
291. See Alex B. Long, The Business of Law and Tortious Interference, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J.
925, 928 (2005) (“Business realities increasingly occupy the time and energy of attorneys.”).
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lawyers from violating the ethical rule.292 Thus, the majority approach in these
situations may conceivably be less the result of the inherent bias of judges in
favor of other lawyers than it is the result of a principled approach to a difficult
problem.
C. What Approach Should Courts Take?
1. Negative Consequences of the Current Approach
The decision to enforce a fee agreement that fails to comply with an ethical
rule might be justified in some instances. So too might it make sense in some
instances to permit quantum meruit recovery when a fee agreement is held to be
unenforceable due to its failure to comply with an ethical rule. However, as the
default approach in these cases, permitting lawyers who have drafted unethical
fee agreements to recover the value of their services despite the unenforceable
nature of the agreement has at least three potential negative consequences.
The first possible negative consequence involves deterrence. At a minimum,
the courts’ tendency to permit quantum meruit recovery in the face of unethical
fee agreements calls into question the assertion that the combined threat of
professional discipline and having an agreement held unenforceable has a
significant deterrent effect on the conduct of attorneys. At most, the courts’
approach may actually encourage attorneys to include unethical provisions in
their fee agreements, knowing that they have the backstop of quantum meruit
recovery. The fact that some lawyers continue to draft fee agreements that
blatantly violate well-established legal and ethical rules regarding fee agreements
undercuts the argument that the practice of declaring such agreements
unenforceable but still permitting quantum meruit recovery is adequate to
vindicate the public’s interest and deter similar misconduct. In some cases, the
failure to comply with a rule may be understandable. But in others, a lawyer’s
failure can only be explained as a willful and blatant attempt to skirt the ethical
rules of the profession.
Take the case of contingent fee agreements in divorce proceedings. These
agreements have been held to be void as against public policy for over 100
years.293 The ethical rule prohibiting such agreements is as clear as it could be.294
In short, no lawyer charging a fee in a domestic relations matter could
reasonably claim ignorance of the rule. Thus, one would expect that these kinds
of fee agreements would be exceedingly rare. Yet, fee disputes between lawyers
and their clients involving these kinds of arrangements still occasionally make
their way into the courts.295

292. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
294. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(1) (2009).
295. See supra Part IV.A.2; see also Rachal v. Rachal, 795 So. 2d 1286, 1291 (La. Ct. App.
2001) (involving an application for attorney’s fees where the attorney charged a contingency fee in
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A more common example of flagrant rule breaking is the fee agreement that
explicitly restricts the right of a client to settle a case without the lawyer’s
permission. It is certainly understandable that a lawyer working under a
contingency fee arrangement would want to limit the ability of her client to
reject a sweetheart settlement offer. But it is also plainly unethical.296 The
prohibition could not be any more well-established. If the threat of professional
discipline and the inability to recover the fee provided for in the agreement were
truly deterrents, one would expect to see few cases involving such fee
agreements in recent times. Yet, cases involving such fee agreements continue to
make their way into the reporters.297
In theory, the threat of professional discipline might help deter unethical fee
agreements. This seems particularly true in jurisdictions in which a disciplinary
authority has the authority to recommend restitution or fee forfeiture as part of a

a domestic relations matter); Marquis & Aurbach v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 146 P.3d 1130,
1138 (Nev. 2006) (involving a disputed contingency fee agreement based on amount of alimony in a
divorce action); Goldstein v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 109 S.W.3d 810, 815 (Tex. App.
2003) (upholding discipline against attorney who collected a contingency fee in a divorce case);
Piro v. Sarofim, No. 01-00-00398-CV, 2002 WL 538741, at *8 app. (Tex. App. Apr. 11, 2002)
(involving a disputed fee agreement in a divorce action in which a lawyer charged a contingency
fee). See generally Ross v. DeLorenzo, 813 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding, in
the context of a suit including both matrimonial and nonmatrimonial causes of action, that an
attorney may not enter into a contingency fee agreement that entitles him to a percentage of the
litigation proceeds recovered in the nonmatrimonial causes of action).
296. See supra notes 181–184 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part IV.B.1; see also Ellis Rubin, P.A. v. Alarcon, 892 So. 2d 501, 504 n.5
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (involving an agreement where the law firm conditioned the client’s right
to settle on written permission by the law firm); In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ind. 1997)
(imposing discipline on an attorney who included a settlement provision in a fee agreement); In re
Kramer, 664 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (disciplining an attorney for inserting language
into a retainer agreement that prohibited his client from settling for less than $100,000 without the
attorney’s consent). Admittedly, there may be some deterrent effect at work because many lawyers
now attempt to avoid this rule and yet accomplish roughly the same result by utilizing hybrid
contingent fee agreements that require a client to pay an hourly rate in the event the client, over the
lawyer’s objection, refuses to settle a matter. See, e.g., Compton v. Kittleson, 171 P.3d 172, 174,
180 (Alaska 2007) (rejecting a hybrid provision entitling an attorney to recover at an hourly rate of
$175 if the client agreed to settle for an amount that would entitle the attorney to less than $175 an
hour for services rendered); Ingalsbe v. Stewart Agency, Inc., 869 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (involving a fee agreement that provided that the client would pay his lawyer $300 an hour if
the client settled against the lawyer’s advice); Gilbert v. Evan, 822 So. 2d 42, 46 (La. Ct. App.
2002) (upholding a hybrid agreement that provided for payment of an hourly rate if the client
discharged the lawyer prior to settlement or trial); Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. v. Smith,
498 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (striking a contingent fee agreement in a divorce
proceeding that provided that if the client reconciled with her spouse, the law firm would be entitled
to recover 150% of its normal hourly wage). Several ethics opinions have concluded that the
inclusion of such hybrid agreements is unethical. See Long, supra note 291, at 956. Some courts
have held that such agreements are not per se unenforceable on policy grounds, see Gilbert, 822 So.
2d at 46, but that the agreement in question was unenforceable because it unduly limited the client’s
right to settle, see Compton, 171 P.3d at 180. See generally Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.,
498 S.E.2d at 847 (declaring a hybrid provision unenforceable but severing that provision and
enforcing the rest of the agreement).
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sanction.298 The reality, however, is that the prospect of professional discipline is
unlikely to be much of a deterrent in these situations.299 Professional discipline
is, in general, a relatively uncommon occurrence.300 Discipline related to fee
agreements is rarer still.301 Clients know when their lawyers do not return their
phone calls or fail to file within the statute of limitations. These are forms of
misconduct that clients can see and intuitively understand. But only fairly
sophisticated clients are likely to know that limitations on their ability to settle or
the charging of contingent fees in divorce proceedings are ethically prohibited or
that there is even anything particularly objectionable about them.302 Other clients
may be sufficiently intimidated by contract language purporting to limit a
client’s right to settle or to make fees nonrefundable that they fail to assert their
rights.303 Therefore, the client may have no reason to even suspect that anything
potentially objectionable has taken place.

298. See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.7 (“Upon order of a hearing panel or court, or upon
stipulation of the parties, and in addition to any other type of discipline imposed, the respondent
may be required to make restitution to persons or entities financially injured as a result of the
respondent’s misconduct.”); In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 924 (D.C. 2002) (concluding that fee
forfeiture was an appropriate condition to the reinstatement of an attorney who was suspended for
entering into a secret agreement to drop a lawsuit against defendant); Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So.
2d 108, 123–25 (Fla. 2007) (requiring an attorney who agreed as part of an engagement agreement
that his firm would not represent future clients in actions against defendant to forfeit over $2 million
in fees).
299. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice:
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829,
857 (2002) (“[U]nderlying most professional regulation is the faulty assumption that professional
discipline works to deter lawyer misconduct.”).
300. See Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 479, 487 (2009).
301. See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 127 (2001)
(“[T]he reality is that professional discipline in the context of fee arrangements is very rare . . . .”
(citing Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–7
(1991))); Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 714 (1994)
(“Courts are reluctant to second-guess fee agreements, and clients are likely to get relief only in
egregious cases.”); Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers’
Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 402 (1998) (“Many disciplinary counsel do not
view fee disputes as raising ethical questions, but instead refer the aggrieved client to a feearbitration body.” (citing Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the
Disciplinary System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339,
1355 (1996))); Melvin Hirshman, Three Subjects for Rumination, MD. B.J., July/Aug. 2003, at 58,
59 (“Discipline for an unreasonable fee is rare . . . .”).
302. The authors of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers explained as
follows:
Information about fees for legal services is often difficult for prospective clients to
obtain. Many clients do not bargain effectively because of their need and inexperience.
The services required are often unclear beforehand and difficult to monitor as a lawyer
provides them. Lawyers usually encourage their clients to trust them.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (2000).
303. See In re Sather, 3 P.3d 403, 413 (Colo. 2000).
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Assuming that client detection of and objection to an unethical fee provision
actually is a realistic possibility in a given case, the loss of an expected fee is
more likely to be a deterrent to lawyer misconduct than is professional
discipline.304 But here, the legal profession has gone to great lengths to limit the
lawyer’s potential losses. While the loss of the fee described in an unethical fee
agreement may hurt a lawyer, quantum meruit recovery may do much to soften
the blow. Therefore, some lawyers may conduct their own cost–benefit analysis
and continue to include unethical provisions in their fee agreements, knowing
that in the unlikely event a client complains to disciplinary authorities or
challenges the agreement in a civil action, the lawyer may fall back on recovery
in quantum meruit. And, in some instances, this recovery may still be
substantial—sometimes even the same amount as the lawyer would have
recovered had the agreement been enforceable.305
The second possible adverse consequence of adopting a presumption in
favor of quantum meruit recovery is that the public’s faith—as well as the faith
of members of the legal profession—in the administration of justice will be
undermined. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts establish two different standards for recovery
in the face of an agreement that is unenforceable on policy grounds: one standard
for lawyers and one standard for everyone else.306 Nonlawyers and members of
the legal profession can hardly be blamed for looking at these rules with a
jaundiced eye. In short, the current approach tends to feed the belief that the
legal profession looks after its own.
Third, there is a real possibility that the majority approach fails to vindicate
the policy values underlying the ethical rules. With professional discipline
sometimes a remote possibility in the case of an unethical fee provision, cases
involving the enforceability of such provisions may often be the only
opportunity to give effect to the policies underlying an ethical rule and to express
the legal profession’s lack of tolerance for conduct that violates that rule. Yet, all
too often, courts offer little in the way of an explanation as to why permitting a
lawyer to recover in the face of an unethical fee agreement is consistent with the
policies underlying the ethical rule in question. Allowing attorneys to recover
substantial sums, sometimes approaching sums that they would have received
had the agreement actually complied with the ethical rules, with little or no
explanation as to why such recovery is appropriate, undermines the policy values
underlying the ethical rules regarding fee agreements.

304. Cf. Hazard, supra note 65, at xxi (“[T]he Restatement recognizes what everyone involved
with the ethics codes knows . . . , namely that the remedy of malpractice liability and the remedy of
disqualification are practically of greater importance in most law practice than is the risk of
disciplinary proceedings.”); Richmond, supra note 117, at 79 (“[P]otential civil liability often deters
lawyer misconduct more effectively than does the threat of professional discipline.”).
305. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Parts II, III.
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2. Precluding Quantum Meruit Recovery and Vindicating the Policies
Underlying the Rules
The law generally seeks to avoid forfeiture, and courts should be cautious
about what one court has described as “the sentimental fallacy of piling on
sanctions unthinkingly once an illegality is found.”307 There may indeed be
situations in which denying a lawyer any recovery would be disproportionate to
the public’s interest in promoting the policy value underlying an ethical rule. But
in light of the potential negative consequences of permitting lawyers to recover
in the face of plainly unethical fee agreements, recovery in quantum meruit
should, in keeping with the approach described in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, be the exception rather than the norm.308 Where it is permitted, courts
need to better explain their decisions to depart from the standard presumption
against recovery when a contract offends public policy.
In many of the other situations described in this Article, it is difficult to see
how, if one applies the approach described in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts in a conscientious manner, recovery in quantum meruit can be
justified on any grounds. According to the Restatement, courts should consider
factors such as “the extent of the party’s deliberate involvement in any
misconduct, the gravity of that misconduct, and the strength of the public
policy.”309 For example, applying these factors to the situation in which a lawyer
has included a clause in a fee agreement limiting the ability of a client to settle
without the lawyer’s permission, there should ordinarily be only one outcome:
total forfeiture. Applying the Restatement’s factors, as the party drafting the
agreement, the lawyer’s involvement in the misconduct would be extensive; the
misconduct amounts to a deliberate attempt to disadvantage a party to whom the
lawyer owes a fiduciary obligation, thus rendering the misconduct quite serious;
and the public policy at issue—the absolute right of a client to settle a matter—
lies at the core of the law governing lawyers. Thus, unless the forfeiture would
be extreme or other mitigating factors are present, recovery in any form on the
part of a lawyer who included such a provision should be denied.
Even if courts believe that denying any recovery would be unfair, they still
need to more clearly examine the underlying objectives of an ethical rule and
explain how those objectives may nonetheless be furthered by enforcing the fee
agreement or permitting quantum meruit recovery. If the public and the legal
profession are to feel confident that courts are truly seeking to advance the
values underlying the ethical rules and not simply protecting their own, courts
need to be more rigorous in their analysis and explanation of their decisions
permitting recovery.

307. Town Planning & Eng’g Assocs., Inc. v. Amesbury Specialty Co., 342 N.E.2d 706, 711
(Mass. 1976).
308. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. b (1981).
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For example, the decisional law in Massachusetts on the subject of contracts
in violation of public policy unmistakably evinces a reluctance to impose total
forfeiture.310 However, the Massachusetts courts have not gone so far as to carve
out an entirely separate approach for lawyer fee agreements that allegedly offend
public policy. Instead, after determining that a lawyer fee agreement offends
public policy, Massachusetts courts apply the same context-specific,
multifactored test to decide whether quantum meruit recovery should be
permitted in disputes involving lawyer fee agreements as they do in other
contractual settings.311 These factors include the following:
[T]he nature of the subject matter of the contract; . . . the extent of the
illegal behavior; was that behavior a material or only an incidental part
of the performance of the contract (were “the characteristics which gave
the plaintiff’s act its value to the defendant . . . the same as those which
made it a violation . . . of law”); what was the strength of the public
policy underlying the prohibition; how far would effectuation of the
policy be defeated by denial of an added sanction; how serious or
deserved would be the forfeiture suffered by the plaintiff, how gross or
undeserved the defendant’s windfall.312
Therefore, although Massachusetts courts only “rarely require complete
forfeiture” of a contract,313 they nonetheless engage in an explicit consideration
of how their decisions will impact the public policy at stake.
Different provisions in a fee agreement and different facts might yield
different results. What is important, however, is that courts give greater explicit
weight to the public policies at stake in these cases. Far too often, courts seem
predisposed toward allowing lawyers to recover the value of their services
without giving due regard to the potential harm to the public’s interest in the
administration of justice that the lawyers’ transgressions may cause. At a
minimum, courts need to conduct the balancing test suggested by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts314 and explain their conclusions as to how the
competing policy interests align in order for the public and the legal profession
to have faith in the courts’ decisions.

310. See Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 188 F. Supp. 2d 115,
124–25 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Massachusetts decisions reveal an unmistakable reluctance to let a
violation of public policy spoil entirely an otherwise valid agreement. Massachusetts courts rarely
require complete forfeiture of the contract, sometimes allow recovery for the fair and reasonable
value of the services rendered, and sometimes permit recovery on the contract in its entirety.”).
311. See id. at 127 (“Massachusetts courts have imported the Town Planning [a case involving
a contract dispute between an engineering firm and its client] factors into cases involving contracts
with attorneys in which the attorneys have violated the rules of ethics that govern them.”).
312. Town Planning, 342 N.E.2d at 711.
313. Daynard, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 125.
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. b.
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Finally, in addition to explicitly weighing the policy interest at stake against
the other factors listed in the Restatement during the initial decision as to
whether to permit quantum meruit recovery, courts should also take the policy
interest into account when determining how much the reasonable value of an
offending lawyer’s services are worth. The fact that a lawyer violated the ethical
rules of the profession should be a relevant factor in assessing the reasonable
value of the lawyer’s services.315 For example, in United States v. 36.06 Acres of
Land,316 a case from a federal district court in New Mexico, a law firm that
withdrew from representation after a client refused to accept a settlement offer
sought to recover on an oral contingency fee agreement.317 The court concluded
that the firm’s failure to comply with the ethical rule governing contingent fees
rendered the agreement unenforceable but that quantum meruit recovery was
nonetheless appropriate because, in part, the “client’s refusal to accept a
reasonable settlement offer” provided the firm with “justifiable cause” to
withdraw.318 After determining what it believed a reasonable fee would
ordinarily be under the circumstances, the court considered what effect the firm’s
violation of the ethical rules should have.319 The court viewed part of its role in
cases in which a lawyer with unclean hands seeks recovery “to vindicate the
public policy evidenced by those rules.”320 Accordingly, the court concluded
“that a reasonable fee under circumstances where the ethical rules have been
breached by not putting the fee agreement in writing should be less than a
reasonable fee in circumstances where no ethical breach has occurred.”321
Ultimately, the court reduced the firm’s quantum meruit recovery by onethird.322
VI. CONCLUSION
Lawyer–client fee agreements occupy an unusual status in the law. Given
the important role lawyers’ fees play in the administration of justice, lawyer–
client fee agreements are invalidated on public policy grounds more frequently
than other types of contracts. In spite of this fact—or perhaps because of it—the
law governing lawyer–client fee agreements permits lawyers to recover for the
reasonable value of their services when traditional contract law would prohibit
such recovery. Although this result can sometimes be explained on a case-bycase basis, the frequency with which courts permit lawyers to recover in the face

315. See Sands v. Runyon, 28 F.3d 1323, 1334 (2d Cir. 1994) (approving the lower court’s
consideration of a fee agreement that prohibited the client from settling without the attorney’s
consent in determining the appropriate attorney’s fees).
316. 70 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (D.N.M. 1999).
317. Id. at 1274.
318. Id. at 1276–77.
319. Id. at 1277.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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of fee agreements that violate well-established ethical and legal rules raises some
troubling questions. Ultimately, the public’s faith in the legal profession and the
policies underlying the ethical rules governing lawyers would be better served by
a return to the traditional approach dealing with contracts in violation of public
policy and a clearer application of the considerations governing those contracts.
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